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PINIONS in the area of appellate practice and procedure during the
Survey period provide appellate practitioners in Texas some gui-
dance, some concern, and some confusion.I Guidance comes from
the Texas Supreme Court's continued refusal to bar access to appeal based
on technicalities. The court has made it clear that a bona fide attempt to
comply with the necessary procedural requirements will invoke appellate ju-
risdiction. 2 The concern exists over decisions like Commonwealth Lloyd's
Ins. Co. v. Thomas,3 in which the Dallas court of appeals interpreted Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure 301 and 329b to require that a motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict must be filed within thirty days after judgment,
even though the rule does not specifically impose that time limit. Finally,
some confusion has resulted following the Texas Supreme Court's decision
in Walker v. Packer.4 The Dallas and Houston courts of appeal, for exam-
ple, have interpreted this important mandamus decision differently in apply-
ing it to the availability of mandamus relief from orders on special
appearance. 5
* B.S., University of Kansas; M.A., University of Michigan; J.D., cum laude, Southern
Methodist University, Attorney, Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
** B.S. Louisiana State University; J.D., Southern Methodist University, Attorney,
Haynes and Boone, L.L.P., Dallas, Texas.
1. The Survey period extends from late 1991 to late 1992.
2. See, e.g., Mueller v. Saravia, 826 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam); see also City of
San Antonio v. Rodriguez, 828 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam). Intermediate appellate
courts may still rely more heavily on technicalities than the Texas Supreme Court. See, e.g.,
Moore v. State of Texas, 825 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992), rev'd, 840 S.W.2d 439
(Tex. Crim. App. 1992). When in doubt, practitioners should take the conservative approach
to procedural issues.
3. 825 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ granted), opinion vacated, 843 S.W.2d
486 (Tex. 1993). On January 20, 1993, the supreme court granted the parties' agreed motion
to dismiss and vacate. The Dallas court of appeals opinion, therefore, cannot be relied upon
as precedent. Nonetheless, it is an instructive insight for practitioners into this court of ap-
peals' inclination on the issue of the timeliness of a motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict.
4. 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992).
5. Compare Laykin v. McFall, 830 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, orig. pro-
ceeding) with N.H. Helicopters, Inc. v. Brown, 841 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, orig.
proceeding).
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II. APPEALS BEFORE FINAL JUDGMENT
In rare instances, that became even rarer during this Survey period as a
result of the supreme court's opinion in Walker v. Packer,6 "appeal" may be
taken before final judgment in the trial court. Petitions for writ of manda-
mus and appeals of certain interlocutory orders are the two available
methods.
A. MANDAMUS
1. The Texas Supreme Court's Comment on Adequate Remedy
Generally, a party seeking mandamus relief must show: (1) a clear abuse
of discretion or violation of a duty imposed by law; and (2) no adequate
remedy by appeal. The six to three decision by the Texas Supreme Court in
Walker v. Packer7 is an important departure from earlier opinions reflecting
a flexible approach to the second prong: whether a party has an adequate
remedy by appeal.
In Walker, the trial court denied the plaintiffs' request for discovery of
documents to impeach one of the defendant's expert witnesses. The court of
appeals denied mandamus relief. The plaintiffs then sought relief from the
Texas Supreme Court. The court denied the petition because, although the
trial court abused its discretion in denying discovery, the plaintiffs did not
demonstrate that the remedy offered by an ordinary appeal was inadequate. 8
The majority in Walker expressly disapproved of cases implying that the
expense of additional delay or other costs may justify mandamus in lieu of a
regular appeal. 9 Thus, Walker establishes a considerably stricter standard
for mandamus relief in Texas.
The majority emphasized that an adequate remedy does not exist when
the appellate court cannot cure the trial court's discovery errors after trial. 10
The court cited three examples:
(1) when the trial court erroneously orders the disclosure of
(a) privileged information that will materially affect the rights of a
party 1 or
6. 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. 1992).
7. Id.
8. Id. The majority pointed out that it did not even discuss the "well-settled require-
ment" of inadequate remedy by appeal in some of its earlier mandamus opinions. Id. at 840-
41 (citing Allen v. Humphreys, 559 S.W.2d 798 (Tex. 1977); Barker v. Dunham, 551 S.W.2d
41 (Tex. 1977)). To the extent earlier opinions did not discuss the adequate remedy prong,
they are partially overruled. Id. at 842.
9. Id. (disapproving of Cleveland v. Ward, 285 S.W. 1063 (Tex. 1926); Jampole v.
Touchy, 673 S.W.2d 569 (Tex. 1984); Crane v. Tunks, 328 S.W.2d 434 (Tex. 1959)). In disap-
proved cases the court had applied the standard that the remedy by appeal must be "equally
convenient, beneficial, and effective as mandamus." Id. (citing Cleveland, 285 S.W. 1063, 1068
(Tex. 1926)). The Walker court decided that this standard is too lenient. Id.
10. 827 S.W.2d at 843.
11. "Once disclosed, retraction of a privileged document is not possible." K.P. v. Parker,
826 S.W.2d 664, 668 (Tex. App.-Dallas, 1992, orig. proceeding); cf Westheimer v. Tennant,
831 S.W.2d 880 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding). In Westheimer,
the real parties in interest had sued an accountant for professional malpractice in connection
with a failed tax shelter investment. The accountant sought to depose a tax attorney who had
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(b) trade secrets without a confidentiality order or
(c) "patently" irrelevant or duplicative documents that cause harass-
ment or undue burden, and
(2) when the trial court's error effectively denies a party a reasonable
opportunity to develop the merits of a claim or defense,1 2 and
(3) when the trial court denies discovery and the discovery cannot be
included in the appellate record or the trial court refuses to make it part
of the record, thereby precluding appellate review. 13
Justice Doggett, who dissented in Walker, described the majority opinion
as a victory for those who would "circumvent discovery and conceal infor-
mation," 14 and described the newly-announced criteria for proof of inade-
quate remedy as a "pseudo-standard," an "excuse for ignoring
wrongdoing."' 5
2. Mandamus Cases in the Discovery Context After Walker v. Parker
Justice Doggett's concern that mandamus relief is more readily available
to the party seeking to "conceal" documents is supported by some recent
intermediate court decisions but assuaged by the supreme court's opinions in
Chapa v. Garcia16 and Granada v. First Court of Appeals.17
In Kern v. Gleason,'8 for example, the Amarillo court of appeals granted a
writ to preclude discovery of the individual defendant's financial statements,
tax returns, and other financial information. The court emphasized that the
individual did not have an adequate remedy by appeal after disclosure of
"virtually all income earned and assets owned by him since 1987,"'19 because
once the information is revealed, the error cannot be cured. 20 The court,
however, did not explain why the exclusion of all such evidence in a second
trial would not cure the error.21 The court appears not to have held the
documents protected by attorney-client privilege or the work product doc-
trine but rather based its decision on the grounds that the order compelling
previously advised the real parties in interest about the same tax shelter. The real parties in
interest filed a motion for a protective order on the day of the deposition asserting the attor-
ney-client privilege. The accountant filed a motion to compel. The trial court denied the
accountant's motion to compel the deposition and the accountant successfully sought manda-
mus relief from the court of appeals. The court of appeals concluded that the plaintiffs' offen-
sive use of the attorney-client privilege was improper because the prior advice received by the
plaintiffs on the same matter that was the subject of their lawsuit cannot be protected from
discovery. Id. at 884.
12. The inquiry is whether the trial would be a "waste of judicial resources." 827 S.W.2d
at 843. The court cited TransAmerican Natural Gas Corp. v. Powell, 811 S.W.2d 913 (Tex.
1991), as an example.
13. 827 S.W.2d at 843-44.
14. Id. at 847.
15. Id. at 856, 855.
16. No. C-9639, 1992 WL 387404 (Tex. Dec. 31, 1992). Chapa is a plurality opinion.
17. 844 S.W.2d 223 (Tex. 1992) (orig. proceeding).
18. 840 S.W.2d 730 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, n.w.h.).
19. Id. at 734.
20. Id.
21. The information could potentially be excluded in the first trial as the trial court had
only ruled on discoverability, not admissibility.
19931
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production invaded the individual's privacy. 22 It suggested, however, that a
renewed motion to compel would be appropriate if the plaintiffs could not
obtain the same information from the corporate defendant. 23 It then stated
that the "order compelling discovery ... was overly-broad, irrelevant and is
not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of material evidence."' 24
The two approaches to the same financial information seem confusing and
internally inconsistent.
In Keene Corp. v. Caldwell,25 the appellate court granted the writ to pre-
clude discovery of certain documents sealed in a suit in federal court as well
as documents claimed to be privileged or covered by the work product doc-
trine. The trial court ordered production after in camera review because the
documents did not "on their face reveal themselves to qualify ... based on
the claims of privilege made for them."' 26 Reversing, the appellate court
chided the trial court for ignoring the affidavits submitted in support of the
privileges claimed as well as the federal court protective order shielding the
documents. No adequate appellate remedy exists, stated the court, when
privilege and exemptions are the issue.27
At the end of the year, the supreme court decided two opinions finding
mandamus relief necessary to command discovery of documents. The Texas
Supreme Court's opinion in Granada Corp. v. First Court of Appeals28 indi-
cates that mandamus will issue if denial of discovery effectively deprives a
party of "a reasonable opportunity to develop the merits of his or her case,
so that the trial would be a waste of judicial resources."' 29 In this case, a
group of investors sued Granada Corporation alleging that Granada had de-
frauded the plaintiff investors. Documents produced by Granada in re-
sponse to the investors' discovery request included four memoranda
containing communications between Granada's lawyers and Granada's of-
ficers. After learning that the memoranda had been disclosed, Granada
moved for a protective order, claiming that the memoranda had been inad-
vertently produced. The trial court granted the protective order and the
22. Kern, 840 S.W.2d at 734.
23. Id. at 737.
24. Id. at 738. The court no doubt meant that the documents were irrelevant and not
reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence, not the order.
25. 840 S.W.2d 715 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding).
26. Id. at 728.
27. Id. at 721; see also GAF Corp. v. Caldwell, 839 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding) (using nearly identical language as Keene to reach the
same conclusion). The privilege must be substantiated in the trial court, however. A manda-
mus proceeding is not a hearing de novo and the court of appeals considers only the evidence
that was before the trial court. See Methodist Home v. Marshall, 830 S.W.2d 220, 232 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1992, orig. proceeding). In Methodist Home, the relators failed to produce in
the trial court any evidence to support their claim that certain documents were protected by
the attorney-client privilege. The court held that the relators waived their privilege claim by
failing to produce any supporting evidence and rejected the relators' belated attempt to supple-
ment the mandamus record with new evidence. Id. at 224, 232.
28. Granada, 844 S.W.2d at 223.
29. Id. at 226 (citing Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 843 (Tex. 1992).
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investors successfully sought mandamus relief from the court of appeals. 30
The supreme court upheld the court of appeals' determination that the trial
court's protective order effectively prevented the investors from maintaining
their cause of action against Granada because the four memoranda were "es-
sential" to proving the investors' fraud claims. 3 1
In Chapa v. Garcia,32 a plurality of the court conditionally granted a writ
to vacate the trial court's order in a products liability action denying discov-
ery of documents concerning design improvements of the Remington Model
700 Rifle. The plaintiff asserting the right to discovery of the documents was
injured when a Model 700 rifle discharged as he was loading it. The court
decided that "because denial of these discovery materials severely vitiates
Relator's ability to present a viable claim at trial, remedy by appeal is inade-
quate."' 33 Justice Hecht filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Phil-
lips, Gonzalez and Cornyn, observing that a grant of mandamus to require
the production of three or four pages when there is an adequate remedy
through ordinary appeal is an example of the supreme court's micromanag-
ing discovery in the trial court.34
3. When Mandamus Relief May Be Available Outside the Discovery
Context
a. Orders on Special Appearance
The Amarillo and Dallas courts of appeal disagreed during the Survey
period about the availability of mandamus relief to correct the trial court's
erroneous overruling of a special appearance. In Laykin v. McFall,35 the
Amarillo court concluded that the erroneous overruling of a special appear-
ance was analogous to one of the three situations outlined by the supreme
court in Walker v. Packer where appeal is an inadequate remedy because of
the excessive burden of going forward. The court stated:
[w]hen a nonresident's special appearance is erroneously overruled, the
burden on the nonresident is great; he must go through an entire trial in
order to have the action dismissed on appeal. Furthermore, the burden
is far out of proportion to any benefit that may obtain to the other
party. In fact, there is no benefit to the other party in having to go
through the expense and delay of an entire trial when the action will be
dismissed on appeal with the result that the trial was an exercise in
futility.36
The court granted relief after finding that the defendant had insufficient min-
imum contacts with Texas. 37
30. See Freeman v. Bianchi, 820 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig.
proceeding).
31. Granada, 844 S.W.2d at 226.
32. No. 3-9639, 1992 WL 387404 (Tex. Dec. 31, 1992) (orig. proceeding).
33. Id. at *1.
34. Id. at *9.
35. 830 S.W.2d 266 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1992, orig. proceeding).
36. 1d. at 268.
37. Id. at 271.
1993]
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The Dallas court of appeals declined to follow Laykin and denied manda-
mus relief from an order overruling a special appearance in N.H. Helicopters,
Inc. v. Brown.38 The court refused to distinguish, for purposes of manda-
mus, a ruling on a special appearance from a ruling on a challenge to subject
matter jurisdiction from which appeal after a final judgment is an adequate
remedy. 39 The Dallas court's opinion seems a more logical application of
Walker than the opinion in Laykin.
b. Void Orders
Mandamus may issue to correct a void order of the trial court.40 In
Decker v. Lindsay,41 the court decided that a trial court's mediation referral
order is void if it requires an unwilling party to negotiate a resolution in
good faith. The court of appeals observed that a trial court may refer parties
to mediation but it cannot order them to negotiate. To do so violates the
open courts provision.42
c. Sanction Orders
If a monetary sanction precludes a party from continuing the litigation,
the party has no adequate remedy by appeal unless the court defers payment
of the sanction until the court renders final judgment.43 In Susman Godfrey
L.L.P. v. Marshall," the trial court ordered a law firm to pay $25,000.00 as a
sanction before final judgment. The law firm sought mandamus relief on the
ground that the trial court's order deprived it of any opportunity to super-
sede or appeal the order. It argued that under Braden v. Downey,45 payment
of a monetary sanction must coincide with the entry of a final judgment.
The law firm, however, did not contend that it was unable to pay the sanc-
tion or that the sanction would affect its ability to appeal the sanction order
after final judgment. The court of appeals therefore denied mandamus relief
on the ground that the law firm had an adequate remedy by appeal. 46
Mandamus will lie if the sanction order prevents the defendant from
presenting evidence to develop its defenses and precludes a decision on the
38. 841 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, orig. proceeding). The court distinguished
Hutchings v. Biery, 723 S.W.2d 347 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1987, orig. proceeding) (child
custody cases raise unique concerns regarding the adequacy of remedy by appeal), and United
Mexican States v. Ashley, 556 S.W.2d 784 (Tex. 1977) (assertion of sovereign immunity by a
foreign nation presents special considerations not present in the instant case).
39. N.H. Helicopters, 842 S.W.2d at 425 (citations omitted).
40. Decker v. Lindsay, 824 S.W.2d 247, 249 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig.
proceeding). This rule does not apply, however, to voidable orders. Ex parte Rhodes, 352
S.W.2d 249 (Tex. 1961).
41. 824 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding).
42. Id. at 251.
43. See Braden v. Downey, 811 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex. 1991).
44. 832 S.W.2d 105 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, orig. proceeding).
45. Braden, 811 S.W.2d at 929.
46. Susman Godfrey L.L.P., 832 S.W.2d at 109. A contention that a monetary sanction
may impair a party's ability to continue the litigation must be raised in the trial court or the
assertion will be considered waived. See Braden, 811 S.W.2d at 929; Susman Godfrey L.L.P.,
832 S.W.2d at 109; TEX. R. APP. P. 52(a).
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merits as it did in United States Fire Insurance Co. v. Millard,47 where the
court struck the defendant's pleadings for failure to comply with discovery
requests.
d. Order Denying Postjudgment Motion to Recuse
In Metzger v. Casseb,48 the court of appeals issued a conditional writ man-
dating that Judge Casseb, a colleague of the trial judge, hear a postjudgment
motion to recuse the trial judge. Judge Casseb had originally refused to do
so on the basis of lack of jurisdiction. The court of appeals held the trial
court had jurisdiction to rule on postjudgment motions to recuse.49
4. Mandamus Procedure
A party requesting emergency relief from the appellate court should file its
original proceeding sufficiently before the deadline to give the appellate court
enough time to determine the merits of the request, rather than seeking such
relief at the eleventh hour.50 In J. A. and Susie L. Wadley Research Institute
and Blood Bank v. Whittington,5 the relator filed, at 4:15 p.m. the day
before two discovery orders became effective, a motion for leave to file a
petition for writ of mandamus and tendered a thirty-eight-page petition and
over 200 pages of exhibits. The relator requested that the court of appeals,
by the end of the business day (within forty-five minutes) grant an emer-
gency stay to place the discovery on hold pending a decision on the merits of
the mandamus petition. The court granted the emergency stay to enable it
to examine the petition.52
The next morning, the court denied leave to file the petition for writ of
mandamus on some points and requested that the real parties in interest
respond to the other issues raised in the petition. In its opinion denying the
remainder of the relator's request for mandamus relief, the court cautioned
practitioners of the dangers of waiting until the last minute to request emer-
gency relief from the court of appeals. 53 Further, the court noted that Texas
Rule of Appellate Procedure 121, by its terms, presupposes that the court of
appeals has granted the motion for leave to file before it grants temporary
relief; the rule does not authorize the court to issue a stay for the sole pur-
47. 838 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding).
48. 839 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding).
49. Id. at 161.
50. See J.A. and Susie L. Wadley Research Institute and Blood Bank v. Whittington, 843
S.W.2d 77 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, orig. proceeding).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 79.
53. Id. at 83-84. The court's precise warning follows:
[w]e are convinced that Wadley simply did not consider the position that it was
putting this Court in when it sought an emergency stay in so little time. We
caution, however, that we might not allow ourselves to be placed in a similar
position in the future, whatever the consequences to the relator might be. We




pose of allowing the court time to review the mandamus petition.54 Petition-
ers are well-advised to pay heed to the court's warning that it may not again
grant temporary relief solely to give it time to read a mandamus petition.55
Although mandamus relief generally must first be sought in the court of
appeals, Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 121 provides an exception to the
general rule if there is a "compelling reason" for initially requesting that the
supreme court issue a writ of mandamus. In LaRouche v. Hannah,56 the
Texas Supreme Court granted a petition for writ of mandamus ordering the
Chairman of the State Democratic Executive Committee to place the rela-
tor's name on the primary ballot as a candidate for President of the United
States. The court found that the "impending election" was a "compelling
reason" within the meaning of Rule 121 for the relator's failure to first seek
mandamus relief from the court of appeals and found mandamus relief was
appropriate because the respondent had failed to fulfill his statutory duties
under the Election Code. 57
B. INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS
1. Orders Denying Motions for Summary Judgment on Sovereign
Immunity
Ordinarily, an order denying a motion for summary judgment is interlocu-
tory and non-appealable. Section 51.014(5) of the Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code, however, provides that "[a] person may appeal from an in-
terlocutory order .... that .... denies a motion for summary judgment that
is based on an assertion of immunity by an individual who is an officer or
employee of the state or a political subdivision of the state."'58
During the Survey period, the Dallas court of appeals and the Houston
court of appeals for the Fourteenth District disagreed on the issue of
whether Section 51.014(5) allows a city to appeal an interlocutory order de-
nying a motion for summary judgment on the basis of sovereign immunity.
In Huddleston v. Maurry,59 the Dallas court of appeals concluded that "per-
son" within the meaning of Section 51.014(5) includes the government and
its subdivisions.6° The court rejected the appellees' argument that interpret-
ing "person" to include the government and its subdivisions would result in
an overly broad category of appellants under Section 51.014(5) and would
allow a governmental subdivision to appeal an interlocutory order based on
an individual's immunity even if the individual did not appeal the order. 6'
The court reasoned that a governmental subdivision should have an in-
54. Id. at 83; see TEX. R. App. P. 121(d) ("[t]he court may grant temporary relief after
granting the motion for leave to file ..... ) (emphasis added)).
55. J. A. and Susie L. Wadley Research Institute, 843 S.W.2d at 84.
56. 822 S.W.2d 632 (Tex. 1992).
57. Id. at 634.
58. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(5) (Vernon Supp. 1992) (emphasis
added).
59. 841 S.W.2d 24 (Tex. App.-Dallas, 1992, writ denied).




dependent right to an interlocutory appeal because the governmental subdi-
vision's liability is based on its employee's action. 62
Just four weeks after the opinion in Huddleston, the Houston court of
appeals for the Fourteenth District, without citing Huddleston, reached the
opposite conclusion in City of Houston v. Kilburn.63 The court dismissed,
for lack of jurisdiction, the City of Houston's appeal from an order denying
its motion for summary judgment based on sovereign immunity, holding
that under Section 51.014(5), only an individual may appeal. 64 The court
determined that the language of the section, ("who is an officer or employee
of the state or [of] a political subdivision of the state") limits who may ap-
peal under Section 51.014.65 Applications for writ of error were filed in both
Huddleston and Kilburn.66
2. Orders Related to Sealing Court Records
Rule 76a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides for appeal of an
interlocutory order if it relates to sealing or unsealing court records. 67 In
Chandler v. Hyundai Motor Co.,68 the Texas Supreme Court, following its
previous holding in Eli Lilly & Co. v. Marshall6 9 , held that an interlocutory
appeal under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a(8) is the proper method for
complaining of a trial court's denial of a hearing and entry of an order limit-
ing public disclosure of documents. 70 The supreme court disagreed with the
court of appeals' opinion that Rule 76a did not address protection from dis-
closure or dissemination of documents during discovery7 and remanded the
case to the court of appeals for consideration of the petitioner's challenges to
the trial court's order restricting dissemination of the documents. 72
62. Id.
63. 838 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ requested).
64. Id. at 345.
65. The court stated:
[i]f Subsection (5) had been written to include the word 'by' before the phrase 'a
political subdivision,' or to include a comma after the phrase 'employee of the
State,' this Court would have jurisdiction to hear the appeal; however, it was not
written in such a way as to grant a political subdivision of the State the right to
appeal the denial of a summary judgment.
Id.
66. On March 24, 1993, the Texas Supreme Court issued a per curiam opinion in Kilburn
denying the application for writ of error. See City of Houston v. Kilburn, No. D-3192, 1993
WL 82682 (March 24, 1993). The court concluded that the city could not appeal under
51.014(5) because the city employee had never asserted the defense of qualified immunity. Id.
at *2. The supreme court's denial of the appeal for writ of error "should not be viewed as
approving the court of appeals' assertion that a political subdivision of the state has no right
under 51.014(5) to appeal the denial of a motion for summary judgment." Id.
67. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 76a(8).
68. 829 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. 1992).
69. 829 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam). Practitioners will note the increased use of
per curiam opinions by the supreme court and may wish to indicate, if appropriate, in an
application for writ of error that the issue(s) presented can be determined per curiam.
70. Chandler, 829 S.W.2d at 775. Rule 76a(8) provides that "[a]ny order ... relating to
sealing or unsealing court records shall be deemed to be... a final judgment. TEX. R.
Civ. P. 76a(8).
71. Chandler, 829 S.W.2d at 774-75.
72. Id. at 775.
1993]
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If the documents are not "court records" under Rule 76a, however, an
order sealing documents is "nothing more than a Rule 166b protective order
that is not reviewable by [an appellate court] on direct appeal prior to
trial."' 73 In Dunshie v. General Motors Corp.,74 the trial court granted Gen-
eral Motors' request for a protective order sealing documents under Texas
Rule of Civil Procedure 166b(5)(c) and entered a separate order granting
alternative relief under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 76a. The appellant
challenged the order by an interlocutory appeal.
As the disputed documents were not made available to the court of ap-
peals for review, the court reviewed the expert testimony presented at the
hearing on the motions for protection and concluded that the testimony sup-
ported the trial court's finding that the documents "[did] not concern mat-
ters that have a probable adverse effect upon the general public health and
safety" 75 and that the documents were not governed by Rule 76a.76 The
court dismissed the appeal because the provisions for interlocutory appeal in
Rule 76a(8) do not apply if the disputed documents do not fall under the
Rule.
7 7
3. Orders Certifying Class Actions
Section 51.014(3) of the Texas Civil Practice & Remedies Code provides
for interlocutory appeal of a class action certification.78 In Pierce Mortuary
Colleges, Inc. v. Bjerke,79 the court of appeals dismissed for want of jurisdic-
tion an appeal from an amended order increasing the size of an existing certi-
fied class. The appellant did not timely appeal the order certifying the class,
and, as a result, the provisions in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(f)
providing for appellate review of subsequent orders of the trial court in an
appeal from an interlocutory judgment, were inapplicable.8 0
The court rejected the appellant's argument that the amended interlocu-
tory order superseded the original order and stated that an amended order
certifying a class action must satisfy Section 51.014(3) to be an appealable
interlocutory order.8 ' "[A]n amended order increasing the size of an ex-
isting certified class does not certify or refuse to certify a class" and therefore
does not fall under Section 51.014(3).82
73. See Dunshie v. General Motors Corp., 822 S.W.2d 345, 348 (Tex. App.-Beaumont
1992, n.w.h.).
74. Id.
75. Id. at 347.
76. Id. at 348.
77. Id.
78. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(3) (Vernon Supp. 1992) ("A per-
son may appeal from an interlocutory order.., that... certifies or refuses to certify a class in
a suit brought under [TEX. R. Civ. P. 42]").
79. 841 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. App.-Dallas, 1992, writ denied).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
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III. PRESERVATION OF ERROR
A. INTRODUCTION
Goswami v. Thetford8 3 is a primer on waiver by failure to preserve error
properly. The appellant waived his right to complain of the trial court's
admission of evidence by failure to object to the challenged testimony,84
waived the right to complain of the trial court's failure to submit a definition
by failing to request the definition in substantially correct form,8 5 waived the
right to complain that a definition was misleading by failing to object to its
submission, 86 and waived the right to complain of improper jury argument
by failing to object, failing to request an instruction, or to move for a mis-
trial. 87 With that brief introduction on preservation of error generally, this
section focuses primarily on the harmful error rule with regard to the admis-
sion or exclusion of evidence and leaves other areas of preservation of error,
such as mistakes at the jury charge stage, to other Articles in this Survey.
B. EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE
Rule 52(b) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a
party make a proper offer of proof in order to complain on appeal about the
trial court's exclusion of evidence. 88 The record on appeal must show the
offer of proof, the objections made to the offer, and the ruling on the objec-
tions. An offer and ruling that does not include the basis of the objections is
insufficient.8 9
C. ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
To assure preservation of error, a party must object to each attempt to
admit the evidence. When a party properly objects to the admission of evi-
dence but essentially the same evidence is later admitted on other grounds
without objection, that party waives any complaint regarding its
admission. 90
In Marling v. Maillard,9 1 the trial court first sustained the objection of
83. 829 S.W.2d 317 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, writ denied).
84. Id. at 319.
85. Id. at 319-20.
86. Id. at 320.
87. Id.
88. If, however, the excluded testimony is otherwise in the record, the court of appeals
may consider, without a bill of exception, whether exclusion of the evidence was error. Riggs
v. Sentry Ins., 821 S.W.2d 701 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
89. Kelly v. Diocese of Corpus Christi, 832 S.W.2d 88, 95 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi
1992, writ dism'd w.o.j.). The court of appeals in Kelly held that the appellant's bill of excep-
tion containing the appellant's offer of proof and the trial court's ruling, but not containing the
basis of the objection, was insufficient to preserve the appellant's complaint that the trial court
improperly excluded a newspaper article because the appellate court could not determine
whether the objection was based on hearsay or prejudice to the appellee. Id.; see also, Craw-
ford v. Deets, 828 S.W.2d 795 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).
90. See Circle Y of Yoakum v. Blevins, 826 S.W.2d 753, 756 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1992, writ denied). Circle Y also held that a bystander's bill of exceptions is defective if sup-
ported only by affidavits of the attorneys in the case. Id. at 755-56.
91. 826 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App--Houston (14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
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appellant's counsel to the qualifications of an expert witness. The opposing
attorney then elicited additional testimony to establish the witness' qualifica-
tions, and the court overruled further objections by appellant's counsel.
Without objection, the witness then answered a question asking for his opin-
ion. The court of appeals held that the appellant waived the right to com-
plain of the admission of the testimony. 92 By refraining from further
objection to the testimony, the appellant's counsel created the impression
that she had decided against challenging the testimony in light of the addi-
tional predicate.93
To preserve error regarding the admission of evidence, objections must, of
course, be timely. In Perez v. Bagous,9 4 for example, the appellant's motion
to instruct the jury to disregard two exhibits, made during the second day of
jury deliberations, came too late because the appellant had discovered during
closing argument that the exhibits had been "tampered with." 95
D. THE HARMFUL ERROR REQUIREMENT
Proper preservation of error and proof of error in the admission or exclu-
sion of evidence must be accompanied by a showing on appeal that the error
"was reasonably calculated to cause and probably did cause rendition of an
improper judgment" in the case. 96
1. Harmful Error in the Admission of Evidence
In Litton v. Hanley,97 the court of appeals found the error harmful be-
cause the "whole case turn[ed] on" the trial court's improper admission of
parol evidence to vary the terms of an unambiguous agreement. 98 In Klein
Independent School District v. Noack,99 a wrongful discharge case, the court
of appeals held that the trial court committed reversible error in admitting
an unauthenticated copy of findings of the Texas Employment Commis-
sion.1°° The Commission's findings negated the employer's defense to the
employee's wrongful discharge claim and concerned "a material issue dis-
positive of the case." 10 1
2. Harmful Error in the Exclusion of Evidence
In Farr v. Wright,'0 2 the court of appeals reversed and remanded for a
new trial a medical malpractice case based upon the erroneous exclusion of
evidence. The trial court excluded evidence of a doctor's treatment of sev-
92. Id. at 739.
93. Id.
94. 833 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
95. Id. at 675.
96. TEX. R. App. P. 81(b).
97. 823 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
98. Id. at 430-31.
99. 830 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
100. Id. at 798.
101. Id. at 799 (citing Boothe v. Hausler, 766 S.W.2d 788, 789 (Tex. 1989)).
102. 833 S.W.2d 597 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied).
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eral similar cases and rendered judgment based on the jury's finding that the
doctor was not negligent. The court of appeals concluded that the trial court
erred in excluding evidence of the prior cases and further held that the error
was harmful because the jury probably would have found the doctor negli-
gent had the evidence been admitted. 103
The Texas Supreme Court, in McCraw v. Maris,1° 4 found the erroneous
exclusion of evidence to be harmful and reversed. The dispute in McCraw
was whether the surviving spouse or the surviving children were entitled to
the proceeds of the decedent's federal employee group life insurance policy.
Under a federal statute, the proceeds of the policy go to the surviving spouse
unless the decedent signed and filed a written beneficiary designation form.
The surviving children claimed that their mother had signed and filed the
appropriate form but the form had been lost. The trial court admitted testi-
mony of two witnesses that the decedent. routinely completed handwritten
duplicate forms before typing and filing an original form. The trial court,
however, excluded a handwritten beneficiary designation form designating
the surviving children as beneficiaries under the life insurance policy and
ruled that the surviving spouse was entitled to the proceeds. The court of
appeals affirmed.
The supreme court first concluded that the handwritten duplicate benefici-
ary designation form was admissible because it was offered only to prove its
existence and not for the truth of any matter asserted within the docu-
ment.105 In considering whether the trial court's error in excluding the du-
plicate beneficiary designation form was reversible error, the court noted
that it is not necessary for a party to show that "but for" the exclusion of
evidence, a different judgment would have resulted; rather, the question is
whether the exclusion of evidence "probably resulted in the rendition of an
improper judgment."' 1 6 A majority of the court concluded that the error in
excluding the duplicate beneficiary designation form was harmful, because
the form, coupled with the testimony regarding the decedent's habit of ini-
tially completing handwritten duplicate forms prior to typing and filing the
original, constituted "crucial circumstantial evidence" that the decedent had
filed the appropriate form designating her children as beneficiaries under the
policy. 107
IV. POST-TRIAL MOTIONS
A. MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
1. The Timing and Procedure for Filing
In Mueller v. Saravia,'0 8 the court held that a motion for a new trial
which was filed under the original cause number rather than the severed
103. Id. at 603.
104. 828 S.W.2d 756 (Tex. 1992).
105. Id. at 757.
106. Id. at 758 (citations omitted).
107. Id.
108. 826 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam).
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cause number extended the trial court's plenary power and thus also ex-
tended the time for appeal of the severed cause. °9 The trial court had
granted a take-nothing summary judgment in favor of one of the defendants,
severed the plaintiffs claims against that defendant, and assigned a new
cause number. Approximately two weeks later, the trial court granted a
take-nothing summary judgment in favor of the other defendant in the origi-
nal cause. The plaintiff filed a timely motion for new trial under the original
cause number and later appealed the summary judgment in the severed
cause. The court of appeals held that the appeal was not timely perfected
because the motion for new trial filed under the original cause number did
not extend the trial court's plenary power.
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the motion for new trial
was sufficient to invoke appellate jurisdiction and avoid dismissal. 110 The
court emphasized that the challenged judgment was itself filed under the
original cause number and all postjudgment motions by the parties were filed
and rulings by the court were made under the original cause number rather
than the severed cause number."' The attempt to perfect an appeal was
bona fide because the motion for new trial was filed under the cause number
contained in the challenged judgment and was filed within the thirty-day
time period in Rule 329b(a). 112
Under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and Texas Rules of Appellate
Procedure, if a filing deadline falls on a Saturday, Sunday, or legal holiday,
the deadline is extended to the end of the next day which is not a Saturday,
Sunday, or legal holiday." 3 The Texas Supreme Court recently decided
whether a day on which the courthouse is closed by order of a county com-
missioners' court is a "legal holiday" for the purposes of extending the filing
deadlines. 14
In Miller Brewing Co. v. Villarreal,"5 the issue was whether a motion for
a new trial was timely filed the Monday following Good Friday on which the
courthouse was closed by order of the county commissioners' court. The
court of appeals had held that Good Friday was not a legal holiday, based on
an earlier decision of the supreme court defining "legal holiday" as including
only those days specifically designated by the legislature and expressly de-
109. Id.
110. Id. at 609.
111. Id. The court reasoned:
[a] party should not be punished for 'failure to comply with the terms of an
order of severance ignored by [both the opposing party] and the court ... [and]
should be able to look to [the] judgment to determine the cause number under
which he should file his motion for new trial.'
Id. (citing Southland Paint Co. v. Thousand Oaks Racket Club, 687 S.W.2d 455, 457 (Tex.
App.-San Antonio 1985, no writ).
112. Mueller, 826 S.W.2d at 609. Mueller is one of several cases demonstrating the Texas
Supreme Court's refusal to deny appellate review based on mere technicalities.
113. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 4, 5(a).




clining to include holidays designated by commissioners' courts.1" 6 In
Miller Brewing Co., the supreme court characterized as dicta the language
upon which the court of appeals based its holding and concluded that a re-
strictive construction of "legal holiday" was not warranted.1 7 The court
held that under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 4 "legal holiday" includes
days declared as holidays by the county commissioners court and days on
which the clerk's office is officially closed.118 The court further instructed
that a party who finds the courthouse closed on the day a document must be
filed may mail the document that day and, if received by the clerk within ten
days, it will be considered to be timely filed. 19
2. The Substance
A motion for a new trial is the proper vehicle for a complaint of excessive
damages. 120 In Pipgras v. Hart,1 21 the appellants filed a motion for judgment
n.o.v. and asked for judgment denying recovery of future medical expenses
beyond the amount pled. The court of appeals held that error was waived
because the appellants failed to object in a motion for new trial or a motion
to limit recovery to the amount pled.122
A complaint that the evidence is factually insufficient to support a jury
finding must also be preserved in a motion for new trial.123 In Hill v. Clay-
ton, 124 the appellant argued that the jury's finding that the defendant was
not negligent was against the great weight and preponderance of the evi-
dence. Although the appellant had filed a motion for new trial urging that
116. See Miller Brewing Co., 822 S.W.2d at 178 (Tex. App.-Antonio 1991), rev'd, 829
S.W.2d 770 (Tex. 1992) (citing Blackman v. Housing Auth., 254 S.W.2d 103, 105 (1953).
117. Miller Brewing Co., 829 S.W.2d at 771.
118. Id. at 772. In an opinion issued the same day as Miller Brewing Co., the court held
that the "legal holiday" language in Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 5(a) should be inter-
preted consistently with the same language in Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 4. In In re V C.,
829 S.W.2d 772, 773 (Tex. 1992), the appellants timely filed their affidavits of inability to pay
costs of appeal on the next business day following Martin Luther King, Jr. Day, a county
holiday by order of the commissioners' court. Id. Effective June 11, 1991, Martin Luther
King, Jr. Day is a state holiday under Article 4591 of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes ("the
holidays statute"). Id. at 773 n. 1.
119. Miller Brewing Co., 822 S.W.2d at 771; TEX. R. Civ. P. 5, 4(b).
120. TEX. R. Civ. P. 324b(4).
121. 832 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ denied).
122. Id. at 367 (citing Siegler v. Williams, 658 S.W.2d 236, 240 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1983, no writ); William S. Baker, Inc. v. Sims, 589 S.W.2d 492, 493 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
123. TEX. R. Clv. P. 324b(2). Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 52(d) complaints
regarding sufficiency of the evidence need not be presented to the trial court in a non-jury case
to preserve error on appeal. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 52(d). A party may not claim on appeal,
however, that the judgment is based on improper conclusions of law if this complaint is not
brought to the trial court's attention. See Winters v. Arm Refining Co., 830 S.W.2d 737, 738-
39 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied). In Winters v. Arm Refining Co., the appel-
lants argued that the trial court's judgment was based on improper conclusions of law. The
court of appeals held that any error was waived because the appellants did not object to the
judgment or in any way direct the trial court's attention to the error. Id. (citing TEX. R. Civ.
P. 52(a); Spradley v. Hutchison, 787 S.W.2d 214, 216 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1990, writ
denied) ("failure to complain to trial court, at any time, about error in its final order so that
court might correct the error, if any, will not preserve that error for appellate review")).
124. 827 S.W.2d 570 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
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the evidence was factually insufficient to support the damage award, the ap-
pellant waived the right to complain on appeal that the evidence was factu-
ally insufficient to support the jury's finding on the negligence issue by his
failure to raise this complaint in his motion for new trial.12 5
Complaints of specific jury misconduct must likewise be preserved in a
motion for new trial. 126 General allegations of improper motive are not suf-
ficient. The appellant in Hill v. Clayton also argued that the jury's failure to
find the defendant negligent was a result of jury misconduct. The appellant,
however, did not include in his motion for new trial any supporting affidavits
and did not allege any specific facts showing jury misconduct. 127 The court
therefore found the appellant's "[b]road general allegations" of jury miscon-
duct insufficient to preserve error.128
A party complaining of incurable jury argument must raise the argument
in a motion for a new trial 129 and satisfy five requirements: (1) the presence
of error; (2) that was not invited or provoked; (3) that was preserved by the
proper trial predicate, such as an objection, a motion to instruct, or a motion
for mistrial; (4) that was not curable by an instruction, a prompt withdrawal
of the statement, or a reprimand from the trial court; and (5) that the argu-
ment by its nature, degree, and extent constituted reversible harmful er-
ror.130 In reviewing a complaint of improper jury argument, the appellate
court evaluates the entire case, and the appellant must show, considering all
of the applicable factors, that the probability that the improper argument
caused harm exceeds the probability that the verdict was based on the
evidence. 1 3 1
B. PREMATURE MOTIONS FOR NEW TRIAL
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306c provides that a prematurely filed mo-
tion for a new trial or a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law is
effective and will be "deemed to have been filed on the date of but subse-
quent to" the time of signing of the judgment the motion for new trial assails
or the time the judgment is signed. 132 Thus, even a prematurely filed motion
for new trial may invoke the extended appellate timetable for perfecting an
appeal. 133
Does a motion for new trial that is both filed and overruled before a final
125. Id. at 574 (citing TEx. R. Civ. P. 324(b); TEX. R. APP. P. 52(d)).
126. TEX. R. Civ. P. 324b(1).
127. Hill, 827 S.W.2d at 574.
128. Id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 327).
129. TEX. R. Civ. P. 324(b)(5).
130. See Macedonia Baptist Church v. Gibson, 833 S.W.2d 557 (Tex. App.-Texarkana
1992, writ denied) (citing Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Reese, 584 S.W.2d 835, 839 (Tex. 1979)).
131. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 584 S.W.2d at 840. In Gibson, the court of appeals rejected
each of the appellant's eleven complaints of improper jury argument. 833 S.W.2d at 561-63.
Portions of the argument were not properly objected to. Other portions of the argument did
not constitute error. As to the remainder of the argument, the court concluded that the appel-
lant failed to show that the error constituted reversible error. Id. at 563.
132. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306c.
133. TEX. R. APp. P. 58(a), 41(a)(l).
[Vol. 46
APPELLATE PRACTICE
judgment is signed serve to extend the appellate timetable? The Dallas court
of appeals answered no to this question in A. G. Solar & Co., Inc. v.
Nordyke.134 The court reasoned that if a premature motion for new trial has
already been overruled, it can no longer assail a later judgment under Rule
306c and can no longer "be properly applied" to that judgment under Rule
58(a).135
The Houston court of appeals for the First District refused to follow A. G.
Solar & Co., however. In Harris County Hospital District v. Estrada,136 the
court withdrew its earlier opinion dismissing an appeal for lack of jurisdic-
tion and held that the timetable was extended by a premature motion for
new trial that was overruled by written order six days before a final judg-
ment was signed. 137 The court noted that requiring a "live" pleading for
application of Civil Rule 306c or Appellate Rule 58(a) would defeat the pur-
pose of those rules to assure that cases are not dismissed simply because a
motion for new trial was prematurely filed.' 38 The court found "no signifi-
cant difference" between a premature motion that has been prematurely
overruled and a premature motion that has not been previously overruled. ' 39
The court thus held:
[w]hen the trial judge denies some or all relief sought in a premature
motion for new trial, the motion can 'assail' those particular parts of a
subsequent judgment under Rule 306c of the Texas Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure and can 'be properly applied' to the subsequent judgment under
Rule 58(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. 14
C. POSTJUDGMENT PLENARY POWER
When no motion for a new trial is filed, a trial court has plenary power
under Rule 329b(d) of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure to make addi-
tional orders within thirty days after the judgment is signed. 41 Orders
signed after this thirty-day period are void. In Giles v. Giles,142 the trial
court, over four months after the final judgment was signed, signed an order
awarding additional attorneys' fees and ordering that a cash bond be posted
to cover these fees. The court of appeals held that the trial court's order was
a nullity because it was signed outside the period of the trial court's plenary
power and further held that the trial court lacked authority to order an addi-
tional cash bond because its power under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure
46(c) to increase or decrease the amount of the cost bond or a deposit had
expired thirty days after the bond or certificate was filed. 14
134. 744 S.W.2d 646 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
135. Id. at 647-48.
136. 831 S.W.2d 876 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
137. Id. at 878.
138. Id. at 880.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(d).
142. 830 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, no writ).
143. Id. at 239.
1993]
SMU LAW REVIEW
Moreover, in Carrera v. Marsh,'44 the court held the trial court had no
authority to grant a new trial because the defendant did not properly invoke
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a to extend the period of the court's ple-
nary power.145 Rule 306a allows a litigant who did not receive notice or
acquire actual knowledge of the judgment within twenty days of the signing
of the judgment to petition the court for a new trial, if done within ninety
days of the signing of the judgment. 46 In Carrera, the party failed to file a
verified motion for new trial to establish a prima facie case of no notice and
also failed to obtain a hearing. Both are required to invoke Rule 306a.147
The trial court therefore had no jurisdiction to grant a new trial. 148
D. POSTJUDGMENT MOTIONS FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT
Although neither Rule 301 nor Rule 329b contains a time limit for filing a
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, the Dallas court of ap-
peals recently held in a case that was subsequently vacated by agreement
that this motion must be filed within thirty days after the judgment is signed.
In Commonwealth Lloyds Insurance Co. v. Thomas,149 a case involving
breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing in the insurance context, the
appellant timely filed a motion for judgment n.o.v. and a motion for new
trial. Then, more than thirty days after the judgment was signed, the Texas
Supreme Court issued its opinion in Murray v. San Jacinto Agency, Inc.,150
regarding the statute of limitations for a bad faith claim. Based on the Mur-
ray decision, the appellant filed an amended motion for judgment n.o.v. as-
serting that the plaintiffs' claim was barred by limitations. The trial court
denied the amended motion.
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that the amended motion for judg-
ment n.o.v. was untimely and a nullity.15' It relied on Rule 329b which
specifically requires that certain postjudgment motions be filed within thirty
days after the judgment is signed. 152 The court equated an amended
postjudgment motion for judgment n.o.v. with an amended motion to mod-
ify, correct, or reform the judgment and held that each is governed by subdi-
144. No. 08-92-00335-CV, 1992 WL 34858 (Tex. App.-El Paso, Nov. 25, 1992, orig.
proceeding).
145. Id. at *6.
146. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a(4).
147. Id. 306a(5).
148. Carrera, 1992 WL 34858 at *6; see also Hjalmarson v. Langley, 840 S.W.2d 153 (Tex.
App.-Waco 1992, no writ) (a trial court cannot enter sanctions order after plenary power
expires).
149. 825 S.W.2d 135 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, writ granted), opinion vacated, 843 S.W.2d
486 (Tex. 1993).
150. 800 S.W.2d 826 (Tex. 1990).
151. Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d at 140-41 (citing Voth v. Felderhoff, 768 S.W.2d 403,
412 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, writ denied); Equinox Enter., Inc. v. Associated Media,
Inc., 730 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987, no writ)).
152. Under Rule 329b, motions and amended motions for new trial and motions to modify,
correct or reform a judgment must be filed within thirty days after the judgment is signed. See
TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(a),(b),(g); Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d at 141.
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vision (g) of the Rule, as is any post-judgment motion that would result in a
"substantive change" in the judgment. It ruled that each must be filed
within thirty days after the judgment is entered.' 53 The court recognized
that subdivision (g) does not specifically refer to amended motions, but em-
phasized that the same deadline applies to amended motions as original mo-
tions for new trial.' 54
The order vacating and dismissing erases the precedential value of Com-
monwealth. Practitioners should nonetheless take note of the original hold-
ing that is contrary to the numerous cases holding that a motion for
judgment n.o.v. may be filed any time before or after judgment as long as the
filing occurs before the court's plenary power expires.' 55
E. POSTJUDGMENT TRIAL AMENDMENTS
A party may ask the trial court for permission to amend its pleading after
a verdict but before judgment.156 In Border to Border Trucking v. Mondi,
Inc.,' 57 the appellant argued that the trial court abused its discretion in per-
mitting the appellee, thirty-nine days after the judgment was signed, to
amend its pleadings to conform with the jury verdict and the judgment. The
majority acknowledged that the trial court has broad discretion in permit-
ting post-verdict trial amendments but held that this discretion does not ex-
tend to postjudgment trial amendments. 158 The court stated: "[t]here
should be a time in the trial of the cause when amendments to the pleadings
should end, and it seems to us that time is after judgment has been rendered
in a cause." 159
Justice Hinojosa concurred in the result but would hold that the trial
court has discretion to permit post-trial amendments to pleadings after the
judgment is signed.160 Rule 63 does not specify an outer limit on the trial
court's power to allow amendments to pleadings and, under Rule 329b(e),
the trial court, within its plenary power could vacate its judgment, grant the
trial amendment, and then enter a new judgment.' 6' The concurrence ex-
pressed the view that the trial court should have the power to permit amend-
ments to the pleadings after the judgment is signed without "going through
the motions" of vacating the first judgment, permitting the amendment, and
153. Commonwealth, 825 S.W.2d at 141; cf United States Fire Ins. Co. v. State of Texas,
843 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, n.w.h.) (motion to correct and/or modify judgment
requested a "substantive change" in judgment and thus extended time for appeal).
154. 825 S.W.2d at 141.
155. See, e.g., Eddings v. Black, 602 S.W.2d 353, 356 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
156. See Greenhalgh v. Service Lloyds Ins. Co., 787 S.W.2d 938, 940 (Tex. 1990); TEX. R.
Civ. P. 63, 66.
157. 831 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
158. Id. at 499 (citing Morris v. Hargrove, 351 S.W.2d 666, 668 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Warren v. Ward Oil Corp., 87 S.W.2d 501, 502-03 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1935, writ dism'd)).
159. Id.
160. Id. (Hinojosa, J., concurring).




then rendering a second identical judgment. 162
V. SUPERSEDEAS BONDS
An appellant cannot be compelled to post a supersedeas bond that in-
cludes the amount of appellate attorneys' fees because such fees are not final
until after the appeal is determined. 163 In Hughes v. Habitat Apartment'
64
the trial court included in the amount of the bond an award of appellate
attorneys' fees. The court of appeals granted the appellant's motion to re-
view the amount of the bond and observed that a supersedeas bond is not
intended to provide security for damages that have not been finally deter-
mined. 165 It therefore ordered the amount of the supersedeas bond reduced
by the amount of the appellate fees. 166
Rule 48 provides that a party may file, in lieu of a supersedeas bond, a
cash deposit of certain negotiable obligations. 167 In some circumstances, an
appellant is not allowed to withdraw his cash deposit even if the appellate
court reverses and remands for a new trial. 16 8 If, for example, the appellant
becomes insolvent during the appeal and the appellate court affirms liability
and reverses and remands only for a determination of the amount of dam-
ages and attorneys' fees, the appellant's cash deposit in lieu of a supersedeas
bond may be legally retained to protect the injured party pending retrial. In
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Chair King, Inc.,169 the court held that a deposit of
cash in lieu of a supersedeas bond remains in effect to secure a judgment that
has been reversed as to damages only if the deposit is made with the condi-
tional language prescribed by Rule 47(a). 170 The underlying action was a
wrongful eviction claim by Chair King against Gill Savings Association.
The trial court rendered judgment for Chair King, awarding it damages and
attorneys' fees. Gill made a cash deposit in the registry of the court to super-
sede the judgment. 17 1
The court of appeals reversed the damage award, reduced the attorneys'
fees award, and remanded for a retrial on damages. While the case was
pending before the Texas Supreme Court, the Resolution Trust Corporation
was appointed Gill's receiver. The supreme court upheld the liability find-
ings, affirmed part of the attorneys' fees award, and remanded the case on
the limited issue of the amount of damages and certain attorneys' fees.
162. Id. at 501.
163. See Hughes v. Habitat Apt., 828 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, leave denied)
(per curiam).
164. Id.
165. Id. at 795 (citing TEX. R. ApP. P. 47).
166. Id.
167. TEX. R. APP. P. 48.
168. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Chair King, 827 S.W.2d 546 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1992, writ requested).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 550.
171. See TEX. R. ApP. P. 48. Rule 48 states that a deposit of cash or a negotiable obliga-
tion may be filed in lieu of a surety bond, "conditioned in the same manner as would be a
surety bond for the protection of other parties." Id.
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Chair King successfully sought a temporary injunction preventing the RTC
from withdrawing the cash deposited to supersede the judgment against Gill.
The court of appeals rejected the RTC's argument that the money depos-
ited in lieu of a bond should be returned to it because the judgment had been
reversed on appeal.' 72 It acknowledged that case law holds that "under the
explicit language in a supersedeas bond, a surety is not liable where the judg-
ment awarding damages is reversed on appeal."' 73 The issue in Chair King,
however, was whether a cash deposit made without such "conditional lan-
guage" remained in effect. 174 The majority in Chair King refused to follow
Am West Saving Association v. Farmers Market of Odessa, Inc. 175 In Am West
the judgment debtor deposited negotiable securities in lieu of a supersedeas
bond as permitted by Rule 48 and did not include any language limiting the
deposit to the judgment on appeal. The appellate court in Am West re-
manded the case for a new trial and the district court held that the negotia-
ble securities deposited must be released. 176
The Chair King court distinguished Am West on the basis that the appel-
late court in Am West remanded the entire case for a new trial on both liabil-
ity and damages, whereas the remand in Chair King was limited only to
damages. 177 Although the portion of the judgment relating to damages was
reversed and remanded for a new trial, the court held that the RTC was not
entitled to return of the deposit. 178 "To hold otherwise would render the
Rule 48 requirement of conditional language meaningless. 1 79
According to Justice Robertson's dissent, once Gill obtained a reversal of
the damages portion of the judgment on appeal, he had "prosecute[d] [his]
appeal with effect" and was entitled to his deposit. 180 Justice Robertson crit-
icized the majority for refusing to follow Am West and two Texas appellate
court decisions holding that the same principles and rules of law apply to
supersedeas bonds as to cash deposits in lieu of a supersedeas bond. 18 1
A cash deposit does not suspend execution of the judgment unless it cov-
ers the full amount of the judgment, costs, and postjudgment interest for one
year. 182 The judgment creditor who contests the sufficiency of the deposit
must seek a ruling from the trial court on the sufficiency of the amount
172. 827 S.W.2d at 549-51.
173. Id. at 550.
174. Id. Rule 48 states a cash deposit may be conditioned in the same manner as a security
bond.
175. 753 F. Supp. 1339 (W.D. Tex. 1990).
176. Id. at 1342-44 (citing Neeley v. Bankers Trust Co., 848 F.2d 658, 659 (5th Cir. 1988))
(quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. LaSalle Pump & Supply Co., 804 F.2d 315, 317 (5th Cir.
1986)).
177. 827 S.W.2d at 551.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 554-55 (Robertson, J. dissenting).
181. Id. at 555. Justice Robertson cited Mea v. Mea, 464 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Tyler 1971, no writ), and Robertson v. Land, 519 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no
writ), for the proposition that the same rules apply to supersedeas bonds and cash deposits.
182. See Gullo-Haas Toyota, Inc. v. Davidson, Eaglesen & Co., 832 S.W.2d 418, 419 (Tex.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ).
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before obtaining review by the appellate court. 183
VI. PERFECTING THE APPEAL
A. THE APPEAL BOND OR NOTICE OF APPEAL
1. The Sufficiency of the Notice
In City of San Antonio v. Rodriguez,184 the Texas Supreme Court affirmed
the policy that "the decisions of the courts of appeals [should] turn on sub-
stance rather than procedural technicality."'' 8 5 An instrument that is a
"bona fide attempt to invoke appellate court jurisdiction" is a sufficient no-
tice of appeal.' 86 In Rodriguez the city timely filed a notice of appeal with an
incorrect cause number. When the clerk discovered the error, she corrected
it by substituting the correct cause number on the notice of appeal. The
clerk's office then informed the city's attorney of the correction.
The court of appeals granted the appellees' motion to dismiss on the
ground that the notice of appeal containing the incorrect cause number was
ineffective to perfect the city's appeal. 18 7 The Texas Supreme Court re-
versed,188 concluding that Philbrook v. Berry,18 9 upon which the court of
appeals relied in dismissing the appeal, was inapposite because in Philbrook
the named parties in each cause of action were identical, and the separate
cause numbers were crucial to avoid confusion.190 In Rodriguez, however,
the court concluded that the incorrect cause number could not have been
confused with the case on appeal, and the trial court entered only one judg-
ment from which the city could have appealed. 91 Because the city's notice
of appeal complied with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 40(a)(2), "but
for the erroneous cause number," the Texas Supreme Court held that the
city had timely perfected its appeal.192
In Smith v. Steen 193 the court followed the "bona fide attempt" rule and
withdrew its earlier opinion dismissing the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.194
In Steen, after the trial court denied the plaintiff's petition for increased child
support, the Attorney General of Texas filed a notice of appeal. The court of
appeals concluded that it "[had] no choice but to dismiss the appeal" be-
183. Id. at 420.
184. 828 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. 1992) (per curiam).
185. Id. at 418 (quoting Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Gonzalez, 820 S.W.2d 121 (Tex.
1991) (per curiam)).
186. Id. (quoting Grand Prairie Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Southern Parts Imports, Inc., 813
S.W.2d 499, 500 (Tex. 1991) (per curiam)).
187. 810 S.W.2d 405, 407-08 (Tex. App-San Antonio 1991), rev'd, 828 S.W.2d 417 (Tex.
1992).
188. 828 S.W.2d at 418. The Court stated that whether the clerk's actions were proper or
authorized by the rules should not be determinative of the city's ability to pursue an appeal.
Id. at 417 n.3.
189. 683 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. 1985) (per curiam).
190. Rodriguez, 828 S.W.2d at 418.
191. Id. (citing El Paso Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Montrose Partners, 754 S.W.2d 797, 799
(Tex. App.-E Paso 1988, writ denied)).
192. Id.
193. 833 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
194. Id. at 179.
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cause the notice of appeal was not filed by a party to the trial court's final
judgment. 195
After the dismissal, the attorney general filed an amended notice of ap-
peal. On the attorney general's motion to reinstate the appeal, the court
withdrew its earlier judgment, held that the original notice of appeal was a
bona fide attempt to invoke the court's jurisdiction, and granted the motion
to reinstate based on the amendment of the defective notice of appeal.' 96
2. The Filing of the Cost Bond
a. The Authorized Signators
An appeal is perfected when a bond, cash deposit or affidavit in lieu
thereof is filed. 197 A party's attorney may sign an appeal bond on behalf of
the party. 198 In Massey v. Galvan' 99 the appellees moved to dismiss the
appeal because the appellant's attorney signed on the line designated for the
principal's signature with the words "David R. Weiner, attorney for Janet
Massey, et al." typewritten above the attorney's signature. 20° The court of
appeals denied the motion to dismiss, holding that an appellant's attorney
has authority to execute the bond "on behalf of the appellant."'201
b. Requests for Extension
Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(a)(2) the court of appeals
may grant an extension of time for the late filing of a cost bond if the bond is
filed within fifteen days after the last day allowed and a motion is filed in the
court of appeals reasonably explaining the need for the extension. 20 2 The
motion for extension of time to file a cost bond must be timely filed with the
appellate court, not the trial court, to avoid dismissal for want of
jurisdiction.20 3
In El Paso Sharkey's Billiard Parlor, Inc. v. Amparan,2°4 the appellants
filed their cost bond with the trial court within fifteen days after it was due.
The motion for extension of time to file the cost bond was filed with the trial
court, however, rather than the appellate court. The appellants later filed a
motion for extension of time in the court of appeals; however, the motion
195. Attorney Gen. v. Steen, 833 S.W.2d 175, 178 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992), judgment
withdrawn, appeal reinstated, Smith v. Steen, 833 S.W.2d 178 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no
writ).
196. Smith, 833 S.W.2d at 179.
197. TEx. R. App. P. 40.
198. Massey v. Galvan, 822 S.W.2d 309, 312-13 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992,
writ denied).
199. 822 S.W.2d 309.
200. Id. at 312.
201. Id. (citing Jefferies v. David, 759 S.W.2d 6, 8 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988), writ
denied per curiam, 764 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. 1989)). The court distinguished cases in which a
non-party or one without legal authority to act on behalf of the party appeared on the bond as
principal. Id. at 313.
202. See TEX. R. App. P. 41(a)(2).
203. Id.
204. 831 S.W.2d 3 (Tex. App.-E! Paso 1992, writ denied).
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was filed four days after it was due. Even though the appellants attempted
to offer a reasonable explanation for failing to file their motion for extension
of time, they did not explain their failure to timely file the cost bond.20 5 The
court emphasized that the reasonable explanation requirement of Rule
41(a)(2) pertains to the failure of a party to timely file a cost bond, not to the
untimely filing of a motion for extension of time to file the bond.206 The
court thus dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction. 20 7
c. The Proper Addressee
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas recently reversed an en banc
decision of the Dallas court of appeals addressing whether a cost bond which
was addressed to the bond forfeiture clerk without specifying district or
county clerk was sent to the proper clerk and properly addressed within the
meaning of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b). 208 In Moore v. State2°9
the cost bond, due on September 9, 1992, was mailed on September 5, 1991
in an envelope addressed to the bond forfeiture clerk on the second floor of
the Frank Crowley Courts Building. The district clerk's file stamp showed
that the bond was not received by the clerk until September 16, 1991. The
appellant did not file a timely motion to extend the time for filing the cost
bond.
In a 7-6 opinion, a majority of the court of appeals concluded that the
envelope was not "properly addressed" because it did not identify whether
the district clerk or the county clerk was the intended recipient. 210 The ma-
jority held that for a paper to be considered "sent to the proper clerk" and
"properly addressed" for purposes of Rule 4(b) of the Texas Rules of Appel-
late Procedure (the "mailbox rule"), the address on the envelope "must iden-
tify with sufficient specificity the exact clerk for whom it is intended. '"211
The dissent criticized this "hypertechnical interpretation" of Rule 4(b) and
the resulting dismissal of the appeal on the "slimmest of technical
grounds. ' 212 Recognizing that the appellate rules "should be construed to
accomplish their manifest purpose to eliminate jurisdictional pitfalls that re-
sult in dismissals on technical grounds, ' 213 the dissent "would refuse to ele-
vate a trivial omission in an address to an empty technicality that deprives a
litigant of his appeal." 214
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with Justice Kaplan's dis-
205. See TEX. R. CIv. P. 41(a)(2).
206. El Paso Sharkey's Billiard Parlor, Inc., 831 S.W.2d at 5.
207. Id. (citing Davies v. Massey, 561 S.W.2d 799, 800-01 (Tex. 1978)).
208. 840 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (per curiam) (court of appeals opinion at 825
S.W.2d 172 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992)).
209. Id.
210. 825 S.W.2d at 173.
211. Id. at 174.
212. Id. at 175-76 (Kaplan, J., dissenting).





sent, reversed the court of appeals and ordered the appeal reinstated. 215 Re-
lying on two cases the court of appeals expressly refused to follow, 2 16 the
Court of Criminal Appeals held that the cost bond was within the construc-
tive custody or control of the district clerk when it arrived in the receiving
department, was received and file-stamped within the ten day period pro-
vided in Rule 4, and, therefore, was timely filed. 21 7 Justice Campbell, con-
curring, would not rely on the principle of constructive possession but would
reach the same result based on the fact that the bond was timely mailed and
was filed within the ten day grace period of Rule 4.218 Justice Campbell
stated that "to hold that constructive possession applies to the present case
could mean that once an instrument arrives in a building's mail department,
the instrument has been properly filed." '219
B. PERFECTING APPEAL AFTER PERMISSION TO APPEAL AS INDIGENT
DENIED
Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 41(a)(2) gives an appellant an addi-
tional ten days to file a cost bond if the trial court sustains a contest to the
appellant's affidavit of indigency.220 This rule, however, does not increase
the time provided in Rule 41(a)(1) for perfecting the appeal. Therefore, a
potential problem arises if the appellant challenges through mandamus the
trial court's order denying him permission to appeal as an indigent.
In White v. Baker & Botts22 1 the appellant timely filed an affidavit of in-
ability to give cost bond, and the district clerk timely contested the affida-
vit.222 The appellant had filed a motion for new trial and therefore was
required to perfect his appeal within ninety days after the judgment was
signed.223 The trial court sustained the contest. 224 On December 4, 1991,
the deadline for perfecting the appeal, the appellant filed in the court of ap-
peals a motion for leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus.225 The court
215. 840 S.W.2d at 441.
216. 825 S.W.2d at 173-74. In Mister Penguin Tuxedo Rental & Sales, Inc. v. NCR Corp.,
787 S.W.2d 371, 372 (Tex. 1990) (per curiam), the Texas Supreme Court ruled that a motion
for new trial timely delivered to the court administrator and later turned over to the district
clerk was timely filed. In Gonzalez v. Vaello, 91 S.W.2d 904, 905 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1936, writ dism'd), the court held that an original petition picked up by the court-
house janitor at the post office on the last day before the statute of limitations ran and left in
the district clerk's internal mailbox was timely filed, even though the district clerk did not see
the petition until two days later.
217. 840 S.W.2d at 441.
218. Id. (Campbell, J., concurring).
219. Id.
220. See TEX. R. App. P. 41(a)(2).
221. 833 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ requested).
222. See TEX. R. App. P. 40(a)(3)(A), 40(a)(3)(C).
223. 833 S.W.2d at 328 (citing TEX. R. App. P. 41(a)(l)).
224. If the trial court sustains the contest and the 90 days has expired, Rule 41(a)(2) gives
the appellant an additional 10 days to perfect the appeal. TEX. R. App. P. 41(a)(2). With the
ten day extension provided in Rule 41(a)(2), the appellant in White was required to file his
bond by December 2, 1991, but the 90 day period under Rule 41(a)(1) had not yet expired;
therefore, December 4, 1991 was the deadline for perfecting the appeal. 833 S.W.2d at 328.
225. Mandamus is the proper method of reviewing the trial court's ruling on an affidavit of
indigence. Id. at 329 (citing Alred v. Lowry, 597 S.W.2d 353, 354 n.2 (Tex. 1980)).
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of appeals denied leave to file the petition for writ of mandamus, and the
appellant timely filed a motion for rehearing, which was overruled on Janu-
ary 23, 1992. Eight days after the court of appeals overruled the motion for
rehearing, the appellant filed a cost bond with the trial court. A divided
court of appeals held that the appeal bond was not timely filed. 226 The ma-
jority noted that "Rule 41(a)(2) extends the deadline to perfect an appeal by
ten days when the trial court refuses to permit a party to appeal as an indi-
gent;" however, the rule does not provide for an extension of time if the
court of appeals denies leave to file a petition for mandamus to review the
trial court's order.227 The majority concluded that it did not have the au-
thority to enlarge its jurisdiction by interpreting Rule 41(a)(2) to give the
appellant an additional ten days from the date the mandamus petition was
disposed of within which to perfect an appeal. 228 The court observed that
"[o]nly the supreme court can interpret Rule 41(a)(2) to enlarge a jurisdic-
tional time limit."'229
This holding, as the court recognized, effectively eliminates appellate re-
view of a case if an appellant is unsuccessful in challenging by mandamus the
trial court's order sustaining the contest. 230 A party will not likely be able to
obtain a final ruling by the appellate court on the mandamus action and post
a bond within such a short time period. 231
The court of appeals urged the supreme court to resolve this problem, but
until the matter is resolved, the court offered the following advice: "[A]n
appellant who attempts to challenge by mandamus the trial court's order
denying him leave to appeal as an indigent, should ask the court of appeals
to enter a temporary order suspending the time to file the appeal bond under
Rule 41 (a)(2). Such an appellant should be prepared to file the appeal bond
within the ten days permitted by Rule 41 (a)(2), as suspended by the court of
appeals. 232
The dissenting justice disagreed with the majority's narrow reading of
Rule 41(a)(2) 233 because the majority's decision renders meaningless the
right to seek mandamus review from an order denying a party permission to
appeal as an indigent.234 If a party has filed a motion for leave to file a
petition for mandamus relief from such an order, filing an appeal bond
within ten days after the contest is sustained would render the mandamus
proceeding moot because the filing of an appeal bond operates as an aban-
226. 833 S.W.2d at 331.
227. Id. at 329. The court stated that Rule 41(a)(2), by its own terms, applies "only to the
court that sustains the contest, not one that reviews the ruling on the contest." Id. at 330.
228. Id. at 329 (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 2(a)); Sifuentes v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 754
S.W.2d 784, 788 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, no writ).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 330.
231. Id. at 329-30. The court noted that under Rule 4 1(a)(2) the appellant actually has 25
days from the trial court's ruling because the appellant may file a motion to extend time to file
the appeal bond within 15 days of the date it is due. Id. at 329 n.7.
232. Id. at 331.
233. Id. at 331-32 (Mirabel, J., dissenting).
234. Id. at 331.
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donment of any attempt to appeal as an indigent.235 According to the dis-
sent, the contest to an affidavit of inability to pay costs is not finally
sustained within the meaning of Rule 41(a)(2) until the court of appeals has
ruled on any challenge to the trial court's order. 236
VII. SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. PRESERVATION OF ERROR
Defects regarding the timing or service of a motion for summary judg-
ment cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 237 In Negrini v. Beale238
the appellants did not file a response to the motion for summary judgment or
otherwise complain in the trial court of improper or untimely notice of the
motion under Rule 166a(c). 239 Accordingly, they waived their complaint.24°
Likewise, Rule 166a(f) states that "[d]efects in the form of affidavits or at-
tachments will not be grounds for reversal unless specifically pointed out by
objection."' 241 Thus, just as objections to improper or untimely notice, ob-
jections to affidavits or attachments in support of or in opposition to a mo-
tion for summary judgment cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. 242
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a trial court may consider
only pleadings and proof "on file at the time of the hearing, or filed thereaf-
ter and before judgment with permission of the court. ' 243 In Leinen v. Buff-
ington's Bayou City Service Co. 244 the plaintiff, two weeks after the hearing
on the defendant's motion for summary judgment, amended his petition to
allege, for the first time, fraud and misrepresentation. Several weeks later,
the trial court, without considering the plaintiff's amended petition, granted
summary judgment. The record did not show that the plaintiff had obtained
leave of court to file its amended petition or that the amended pleading had
been brought to the trial court's attention. 245 The court of appeals held that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider the
amended petition filed after the summary judgment hearing. 246
235. Id. (citing Stein v. Frank, 575 S.W.2d 399, 400 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1978, orig.
proceeding)). The majority also recognized this problem. 833 S.W.2d at 329 n.5.
236. Id. at 331. The rule itself does not refer to either the trial court or the court of appeals
and would allow the liberal reading the dissent gives it. TEX. R. App. P. 41(a)(2).
237. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
238. 822 S.W.2d 822 (Tex. App-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, n.w.h.).
239. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
240. 822 S.W.2d at 823-24.
241. TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(f).
242. See Einhorn v. Lachance, 823 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tex. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1992,
writ dism'd w.o.j.) (failure to object to inadmissable hearsay evidence contained in summary
judgment affidavit waived such objection).
243. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 166a(c).
244. 824 S.W.2d 682 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ).
245. 824 S.W.2d at 685.
246. Id. at 685 (citing Hill v. Milani, 678 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Tex. App.-Austin 1984), affd,
686 S.W.2d 610 (Tex. 1985)).
1993]
SMU LAW REVIEW
B. APPEAL FROM A SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In Wilburn v. State247 the court of appeals reaffirmed the general rule that
a party may challenge the legal sufficiency of the movant's summary judg-
ment proof even if the nonmovant did not file an answer or response to the
motion for summary judgment. 248 The court considered the nonmovant's
position that there was no evidence of the date any tax liability was created
or incurred to be a legal sufficiency challenge and allowed her to raise the
point.249 Thus the nonmovant's failure to challenge the legal sufficiency in
her response or cross-motion did not preclude her from raising the challenge
on appeal. 250
Furthermore, if both parties file motions for summary judgment, and the
appellant challenges only the trial court's granting of the appellee's motion
for summary judgment and not the denial of its own, the court of appeals,
upon finding error, can only reverse and remand. 251 It cannot render judg-
ment for the appellant. 252
C. FINALITY OF A SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A summary judgment that does not dispose of all parties and issues is
interlocutory and not appealable without a severance or nonsuit of un-
resolved parties and issues.253 Ross v. Arkwright Mutual Insurance Co. 25 4
involved an appeal from eight orders granting summary judgment which,
although not identical, generally stated that the motion for summary judg-
ment was granted in favor of each particular defendant and that the plaintiffs
"take or recover nothing" from that defendant. 255 The orders did not con-
tain a "Mother Hubbard" clause2 56 or expressly refer to all issues
decided. 257
The Ross court emphasized that the presence of a Mother Hubbard clause
should not be dispositive.258 Rather, any order granting a motion for sum-
mary judgment that fails to address all the issues or all of the parties should
247. 824 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App,-Austin 1992, no writ).
248. Id. at 763 (citing City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678
(Tex. 1979)).
249. Id. at 763 n. 12.
250. Id. at 763.
251. Pine v. Salzer, 824 S.W.2d 779, 780 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1992, no writ)
(citing Buckner Glass & Mirror v. T. A. Pritchard Co., 697 S.W.2d 712, 714 (Tex. App.-
Corpus Christi 1985, no writ)).
252. Id. In Pine, neither party responded to the other's motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, the court of appeals could consider only whether the appellee's grounds for sum-
mary judgment were insufficient as a matter of law. Id. at 394.
253. See Ross v. Arkwright Mut. Ins. Co., 834 S.W.2d 385, 390 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1992, writ granted) (citing Pan Am. Petroleum Corp. v. Texas Pac. Coal & Oil
Co., 324 S.W.2d 200, 201 (1959)). Id. at n.4.
254. 834 S.W.2d 385.
255. Id. at 394.
256. The typical Mother Hubbard clause states, "[AII relief not expressly granted is
hereby denied." Id. at 391.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 391, 393.
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be considered interlocutory. 259 It concluded, however, that under present
supreme court authority, if an order contains Mother Hubbard language or
refers to all issues or parties, it is considered final, regardless of whether all
issues were decided. 260 Although the court opined that "Mother Hubbard
language has no place in an order granting a motion for summary judg-
ment" 261 and expressly approved of two other courts of appeals' holdings
that a motion for summary judgment that does not address all parties and
issues is interlocutory despite the inclusion of Mother Hubbard language,
the Ross court, "constrained by law to follow precedent set by the Texas
Supreme Court," dismissed the appeal because the "take nothing" language
used by the trial court did not constitute Mother Hubbard language.262
To render an interlocutory summary judgment final and appealable, a
party may seek a severance or take a non-suit. The party appealing from the
summary judgment is best advised, however, to appeal within thirty days of
the notice itself rather than any related order because there is a split of au-
thority regarding whether the filing of a notice of non-suit or the signing of
the order on non-suit renders final and appealable an interlocutory summary
judgment. 263 Rule 162 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a
party may take a non-suit and that "[n]otice of the dismissal or non-suit
shall be served in accordance with Rule 21 a ... without necessity of court
order.''264 Before the current version of Rule 162 became effective on Janu-
ary 1, 1988, non-suits were governed by former Rule 164, which did not
contain the emphasized language.265 Thus, under the current rule, an order
granting a non-suit is unnecessary, although some courts prefer that the no-
tice be reinforced with an order.266
The Fourteenth court of appeals held in Merrill Lynch Relocation Man-
agement, Inc. v. Powel1267 that the "interlocutory summary judgment order
259. Id. at 393.
260. Id. at 392-93 (citing New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 799 S.W.2d 677
(Tex. 1990); Teer v. Duddleston, 664 S.W.2d 702 (Tex. 1984); Chessher v. Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 658 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. 1983)).
261. Id. at 394 n.6.
262. Id. at 393-94. The Dallas and Amarillo courts of appeal have held that the trial
court's inclusion of a Mother Hubbard clause in an order granting summary judgment does
not render that judgment final and appealable if the judgment does not otherwise dispose of all
parties and issues. See Bethurum v. Holland, 771 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Tex. App.-Amarillo
1989, no writ); Sasker v. Fitze, 708 S.W.2d 40, 43 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1986, no writ).
On rehearing, the court of appeals distinguished the situation in Ross from its decision in
Merrill Lynch Relocation Management v. Powell, 824 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding). See Ross, 834 S.W.2d at 394-95. In Merrill Lynch Relocation
Management, the order granting summary judgment referred to motions and responses raising
all issues in the case and therefore disposed of causes not addressed in the motion for summary
judgment. 824 S.W.2d at 806. In contrast, the order in Ross did not dispose of all parties and
issues; it simply stated that plaintiffs should take nothing. 834 S.W.2d at 395.
263. See infra notes 267-72 and accompanying text (discussing the disagreement of these
courts).
264. TEX. R. Civ. P. 162 (emphasis added).
265. Id., historical note.
266. See Avmanco, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie, 835 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth
1992, writ dism'd); see also notes 270-72 and accompanying text (discussing the Avmanco, Inc.
court's requirement of a signed order).
267. 824 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, orig. proceeding).
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became final and appealable" when a notice of non-suit was filed and when
the opposing party properly filed its motion for new trial within thirty days
after the notice of non-suit was filed. 268 Although the trial court did not sign
an order of non-suit, the Merrill Lynch Relocation Management court, citing
Rule 162, properly recognized that "[n]o court order was necessary to effect
a final judgment. '269
The Fort Worth court of appeals reached a different conclusion in
A vmanco, Inc. v. City of Grand Prairie.270 The trial court granted the city's
motion for summary judgment, and the city filed a notice of non-suit to dis-
miss its counterclaim to render the interlocutory summary judgment final
and appealable. Two days after the city filed its notice of non-suit, the trial
court signed an order of non-suit. The appellant filed a motion for new trial
on the thirtieth day after the trial court signed the order of non-suit but
thirty-two days after the city had filed its notice of non-suit. The appellant
filed its cost bond ninety-four days after the notice of non-suit was filed, and
the city moved to dismiss the appeal on the grounds that the appellant's
motion for new trial was untimely and, therefore, its appeal bond was also
untimely. The court of appeals held that the trial court's signing the order of
non-suit, not the mere filing of the notice of non-suit, triggered the appellate
timetable. 27' Thus, the Fort Worth court apparently requires an order of
non-suit even though Rule 162 does not require an order and despite the fact
that Texas courts have long recognized that the trial court's granting of a
non-suit is merely a ministerial act. 272
VIII. RECORD ON APPEAL
A. TIMELY FILING OF THE RECORD
Under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 54(a), the transcript and state-
ment of facts must be filed in the court of appeals within sixty days after the
judgment is signed or within 120 days after the judgment is signed if a party
timely files a motion for new trial or to modify the judgment or timely files a
request for findings of fact and conclusions of law in a case tried without a
jury. 273 Rule 54(c) provides that a party seeking an extension of time for
late filing of a transcript or statement of facts must reasonably explain any
268. Id. at 806.
269. Id.
270. 835 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, writ dism'd).
271. Id. at 163-64. The court in Avmanco Inc. cited as partial support for its holding cases
decided prior to the 1988 amendments to Rule 162. Id. at 164. The court stated that "[t]he
finality of a judgment for the purpose of appeal should be determined from the terms of the
trial court's orders. Otherwise, the opposing party ... might not be advised as to when the
time for [filing a motion for new trial or cost bond] begins to run." Id. Rule 162's requirement
that a notice of non-suit be served in accordance with Rule 21a ensures, however, that a party
to an interlocutory judgment receives notice that the judgment has become final. See TEX. R.
Civ. P. 162.
272. See BHP Petroleum Co., Inc. v. Millard, 800 S.W.2d 838, 840-41 (Tex. 1990, orig.
proceeding); Shadowbrook Apts. v. Abu-Ahmad, 783 S.W.2d 210, 211 (Tex. 1990); Greenberg
v. Brookshire, 640 S.W.2d 870, 872 (Tex. 1982) (orig. proceeding).
273. TEX. R. App. P. 54(a).
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delay in requesting the court reporter to prepare the statement of facts.274
The Dallas court of appeals has held that an appellant who fails to request
the statement of facts timely cannot rely upon a cross-appellant's timely re-
quest in conjunction with a motion to extend time to file the statement of
facts under Rule 54(c). 2 7 5
In Inman's Corp. v. Transamerica Commercial Finance Corp. 276 Inman's
timely perfected an appeal from the trial court's final judgment. On the last
date for perfecting an appeal and for making a request to the court reporter,
Transamerica filed a cash deposit in lieu of bond and made a written request
to prepare the statement of facts. Inman's later filed an untimely request for
the statement of facts, a timely motion and a timely supplemental motion to
extend the time to file the statement of facts. Transamerica objected to In-
man's motions because neither motion explained Inman's delay in making its
request to the court reporter as required by Rule 54(c). 2 7 7 The court of
appeals rejected Inman's argument that Transamerica's timely request in-
ured to Inman's benefit. 278
The court criticized as "ill-advised" Inman's assumption that it could rely
on the actions taken by Transamerica and denied Inman's motion to extend
time to file the statement of facts.279 Inman's simply did not give a reason-
able explanation for its delay in making a written request for the statement
of facts to the court reporter as required by Rule 54(c). 280 Although recog-
nizing that its ruling was "harsh," the court emphasized that Inman's, "like
any other appellant, had the opportunity to timely request the statement of
facts" and "had an opportunity to reasonably explain the delay. ' 281
The Tyler court of appeals was the first court to interpret a 1990 amend-
ment to Rule 54(a) providing additional time for filing the record if a timely
request for findings of fact and conclusions of law is filed in a non-jury
case. 2 8 2 Smith v. Smith,283 a divorce case, was tried to a jury. After the
verdict, the wife filed a motion for judgment n.o.v. The trial court signed a
divorce decree granting the divorce on the no-fault grounds found by the
jury and made its own division of certain properties not submitted to the
jury.
274. Id. (c).
275. Inman's Corp. v. Transamerica Commercial Fin. Corp., 825 S.W.2d 473, 475-76 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1991, no writ).
276. 825 S.W.2d 473.
277. TEX. R. App. P. 54(c).
278. Inman's Corp., 825 S.W.2d at 475-77. Inman's argument was that it did not need to
explain the delay for its untimely request. Inman's argued that one party's request to prepare
the statement of facts "should be for the benefit of all parties in the same manner a motion for
new trial filed by one party extends the appellate timetables for all parties." Id. at 475. How-
ever, Rule 41(a)(l) expressly provides that a timely motion for new trial extends the appellate
timetables for all the parties, but Rule 53(a) does not contain such a provision. See TEX. R.
App. P. 41(a)(l), 53(a).
279. Inman's Corp., 825 S.W.2d at 477.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 478.
282. See TEX. R. App. P. 54(a), historical note.
283. 835 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1992, no writ).
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The husband filed a timely request for findings of fact and conclusions of
law but did not file a motion for new trial. Later, the wife moved to dismiss
the husband's appeal on the ground that the record was not timely filed. In
response, the husband argued that he was entitled to the extended time pe-
riod for filing the record because he had timely requested findings of fact and
conclusions of law. The husband urged that because the trial judge made
certain fact findings regarding disposition of the properties not submitted to
the jury, the case was "'tried without a jury' within the meaning of Rule
54(a)." 284
Despite the novel argument, the court dismissed the appeal. 285 Although
a trial judge is not bound by the jury's division of marital property, the fact
that the judge made additional findings did not convert the case into a non-
jury case within the meaning of Rule 54(a). 286 A timely motion for new trial
would have extended the time for filing the record in the court of appeals but
a request for findings of fact and conclusions of law in any aspect of a jury
case does not.2 8 7
B. THE RECORD'S CONTENTS
Documents and exhibits not filed of record in the trial court are not prop-
erly part of the record on appeal. 28 8 In Martinez v. Valencia the court of
appeals refused to consider an attorney's letter and settlement papers,
although the court had previously granted the appellees' motion to supple-
ment the record with these documents on appeal. 289 The court cited the
general rule that documents and exhibits not filed of record in the trial court
are not properly considered on appeal. 290 The court observed it would be
acting as a court of original jurisdiction rather than an appellate court if it
were to consider evidence not before the trial court.291
An appellant seeking review of a municipal ordinance must include the
ordinance in the trial court record. 292 In Metro Fuels, Inc. v. City of Austin
the trial court had taken judicial notice of the municipal ordinance, but the
ordinance itself was not made part of the record. 293 Although a court, on its
own motion, may take judicial notice of an ordinance under Texas Rule of
Civil Evidence 204, the appellate court in Metro Fuels Inc. refused to do so
284. Id. at 190.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.; see also TEX. R. App. P. 54(a).
288. Martinez v. Valencia, 824 S.W.2d 719, 722 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1992, no writ).
289. Id.
290. Id. (citing Noble Exploration, Inc. v. Nixon Drilling Co., 794 S.W.2d 589, 592 (Tex.
App.-Austin 1990, no writ); Deerfield Land Joint Venture v. Southern Union Realty Co., 758
S.W.2d 608, 609 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, writ denied); City of Galveston v. Sheu, 607
S.W.2d 942, 944 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1980, no writ)).
291. Martinez, 824 S.W.2d at 722.
292. Metro Fuels, Inc. v. City of Austin, 827 S.W.2d 531, 532 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992,
no writ).
293. In response to the appellate court's request that the appellants file a supplemental
transcript, the appellants responded that the ordinance was not part of the trial court record.
Instead, the appellants provided the court of appeals with a certified copy of the ordinance.
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because there was no showing that the version proffered by the appellants
was the version of the ordinance upon which the trial court relied.294 The
court noted that municipal and county ordinances are difficult to research
and verify and concluded that the appellants had failed to present a sufficient
record to show error requiring reversal. 295
The sufficiency of the record is the appellant's burden.296 In City ofAustin
v. Gifford297 the appellants waived any complaint as to the trial court's de-
nial of their motion for leave to file a trial amendment because they did not
raise this complaint in any of their points of error, and the record did not
contain any reference to a trial amendment or any order overruling the ap-
pellants' motion. 298
Under Rule 53(k), the appellant has the duty to timely file the statement
of facts in the court of appeals. 299 In Wells v. Kansas University Endowment
Association300 the appellant did not do so. Without a statement of facts, the
court of appeals must presume that sufficient evidence supports the findings
upon which the judgment was based.30 1 Therefore, the court in Wells could
not consider the appellant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the trial court's judgment. 30 2
A party complaining that the trial court abused its discretion has the bur-
den to bring forward on appeal a record showing that the trial court's deci-
sion was arbitrary and unreasonable.3 0 3 In Sutton v. Eddy30 4 the court of
appeals overruled ten of the appellant's points of error complaining of the
trial court's abuse of discretion because the appellant did not bring forward a
complete statement of facts from the various hearings in which the trial
judge made the challenged rulings. 30 5 Thus, the court of appeals presumed
that the evidence supported the trial court's rulings. 30 6
In Johnson v. Whitney Sand & Gravel, Inc. 30 7 the trial court entered a
sanction order dismissing with prejudice the defendants' counterclaim. The
appeal was submitted only on the transcripts because the defendants did not
timely file a statement of facts from the sanctions hearing. Therefore, the
294. 827 S.W.2d at 532.
295. Id. (citing TEX. R. App. P. 50(d)).
296. TEX. R. App. P. 50(d).
297. 824 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, n.w.h.).
298. Id. at 741.
299. TEX. R. App. P. 53(k).
300. 825 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ denied).
301. Id. at 487 (citing Ward v. Lubojasky, 777 S.W.2d 156, 157 (Tex. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1989, no writ); Men's Wearhouse v. Helms, 682 S.W.2d 429, 430 (Tex. App.-
Houston [lIst Dist.] 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 804 (1985)).
302. Id.; see also Watson v. Century Condominiums, Ltd., 825 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, no writ) (stating that appellate court had to presume that the trial
court's judgment was supported by sufficient evidence when appellant filed only a transcript
and no statement of facts).
303. Sutton v. Eddy, 828 S.W.2d 56, 58 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, no writ) (citing
Englander Co. v. Kennedy, 428 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex. 1968); TEX. R. APP P. 50(d)).
304. Sutton, 828 S.W.2d at 56.
305. Id. at 58-59.
306. Id. at 59.
307. 828 S.W.2d 801 (Tex. App.-Waco 1992, no writ).
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record was insufficient to show that the trial court abused its discretion in
imposing a "death penalty" sanction. 30 8
C. LIMITATION OF THE APPEAL
An appellant may limit the scope of an appeal if he complies with Texas
Rules of Appellate Procedure 40(a)(4) and 53(a). 309 In Kwik Wash Laun-
dries, Inc. v. McIntyre310 the appellant defined the issue in his Limitation of
Appeal as: "[t]he existence and liability on the Kwik Wash Laundries, Inc.
lease and the damages and attorneys' fees recoverable by Kwik Wash Laun-
dries, Inc. for breach of the Kwik Wash Laundries, Inc. lease."' 31' Appellant
also requested a partial statement of facts under Rule 53(d) that requires a
"statement of the points to be relied on."'312 Kwik Wash did not include the
points to be relied on in its request for a statement of facts, and the court
found the statement of the issue in the Limitation of Appeal to be an insuffi-
cient substitute. 31 3 The appellee made the same errors in its cross-appeal.
The court therefore dismissed the appeal because neither party had properly
stated the points on appeal or provided a sufficient record for review. 314
IX. BRIEFS ON APPEAL
A. FAILURE TO TIMELY FILE
An appellant's failure to timely file its brief may result in dismissal on the
court's own motion for want of prosecution. 315 The appellant in Sentinel
Pipe Service Inc. v. Tandy Computer Leasing,316 having obtained two exten-
sions of time for filing its brief, failed to file its brief by the due date. Ap-
proximately five weeks later, the court of appeals, on its own motion,
dismissed the appeal for want of prosecution because the appellant had not
provided the court with an explanation for its third failure to file its brief
timely. 317
B. WAIVER BY FAILURE TO BRIEF POINTS
Points of error not supported with argument and authorities are
308. Id. at 805 (citing TEX. R. App. P. 50(d); Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833 (Tex.
1992, orig. proceeding).
309. See TEX. R. App. P. 40(a)(4), 53(a). Rule 40(a)(4) provides: "[n]o attempt to limit
the scope of an appeal shall be effective unless the severable portion of the judgment from
which the appeal is taken is designated in a notice served on all other parties." TEX. R. APP.
P. 40(a)(4).
310. 840 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, no writ).
311. Id. at 741.
312. TEX. R. App. P. 53(d). Rule 53(a) provides: "[t]he appellant, at or before the time
prescribed for perfecting the appeal, shall make a written request to the official reporter
designating the portion of the evidence and other proceedings to be included therein." Id.
313. 840 S.W.2d at 741.
314. Id. at 742-43.
315. TEX. R. App. P. 71(l)(1).
316. 825 S.W.2d 212 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992, n.w.h.).
317. Id. (citing TEX. R. App. P. 74(l)(1)).
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waived. 3' 8 In White v. Bath the court held that the appellant waived seven
points of error that were not supported.319 The "scant discussion" under
these points of error consisted only of "conclusory statements and ques-
tions," and one point of error was merely stated without any argument.3 20
C. BRIEFS ON APPEAL FROM TEMPORARY INJUNCTION
An appellant appealing from an order granting a temporary injunction
may move the court to allow the case to be submitted without briefs; the
appellant must, however, show good cause why briefs should not be re-
quired.321 In Lagrone v. John Robert Powers Schools, Inc.322 the appellants
appealed from a temporary injunction enforcing an anti-competition clause
in a franchise agreement. On the date the appellants' brief was due, the
appellants filed a motion to give priority to the appeal under Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 42(b) but did not file a brief. In their motion, the ap-
pellants argued that the disputed issues were clear from the record and briefs
were unnecessary.
The court of appeals emphasized that although under Rule 42(c) acceler-
ated appeals may be decided without briefs, the court of appeals, not the
appellant, decides whether briefs will be required.3 23 Prior case law under
former article 4662, which gave the appellant the right to decide whether to
file a brief, is no longer valid.324 Apart from the appellant's thwarting Rule
42(c)'s intent to provide for expedient determination of accelerated appeals
by announcing on the last possible date that it did not intend to file a brief,
the appellants failed to show good cause why briefs should not be re-
quired. 325 The court therefore ordered the appellants to file a brief within
twenty days or face dismissal or affirmance under Rule 42(a)(3) without fur-
ther notice.326
X. COSTS ON APPEAL
If the court of appeals reverses, the appellee may be required to pay costs,
318. White v. Bath, 825 S.W.2d 227, 230 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ
denied), pet. for cert. filed, No. 72-7783 (Feb. 26, 1993) (citing Trenholm v. Ratcliff, 646
S.W.2d 927, 934 (Tex. 1983)).
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. See TEX. R. App. P. 42(c) (allowing for submission of accelerated appeals without
briefs); see also TEX. R. App. P. 42(a)(3) ("[flailure to file either the record or appellant's brief
within [20 days after the record is filed], unless reasonably explained, shall be ground for
dismissal or affirmance under Rule 60 .... ").
322. 841 S.W.2d 34 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ).
323. Id. at 37.
324. Id. Article 4662 became Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 385. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 385,
historical note (Vernon 1985). Rule 385 was amended, effective in 1981, to give the court of
appeals discretion as to whether briefs are required in an appeal from a temporary injunction.
Id. This provision of Rule 385 is now part of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(a)(3). See
TEX. R. App. P. 42(a)(3).




including the costs of the transcript and statement of facts.327 On the other
hand, Rule 84 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides that the
court of appeals may, as part of its judgment, award a prevailing appellee
damages if it determines that the appellant has taken the appeal "for delay
and without sufficient cause."'328 The court in Schmidt v. Centex Beverage,
Inc. 329 refused to assess damages under Rule 84, however, because after the
appeal was filed, the Texas Supreme Court reversed one of the primary cases
relied upon by the appellant. 330 Accordingly, the court of appeals refused to
find that the appeal was brought without sufficient cause.331
In Roever v. Roever 332 the appellate court awarded damages. 333 The hus-
band in that case appealed from a judgment of divorce dividing the parties'
assets and debts and challenged the trial court's award of $7500 in attorneys'
fees to the wife. He relied on the trial court's docket sheet notations that the
community property estate was of nominal value. The court of appeals af-
firmed the trial court's judgment and sustained the wife's cross point re-
questing an award of damages for delay under Rule 84.334 The court
concluded that the husband's lawyer "had no reasonable grounds to believe"
that the court of appeals would reverse the trial court's judgment.3 35 The
husband's contention regarding the value of the community estate was un-
supported by the record, and the husband's lawyer did not bring to the
court's attention the "legion of contrary law" in connection with his reliance
on the trial court's docket entries. 336
X. DISMISSAL OF APPEAL
A. MOTIONS TO DISMISS
If the parties to an appeal file a joint motion to dismiss, the appeal is moot
and the court of appeals must dismiss the case.3 37 In Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith v. Hughes,338 the parties settled after the appeal was per-
fected and filed a joint motion to dismiss the appeal. The court of appeals,
however, issued an opinion dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction. 339
327. TEX. R. App. P. 89; see Holloway v. Butler, 828 S.W.2d 810, 813 (Tex. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist] 1992, writ denied).
328. TEX. R. App. P. 84.
329. 825 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, n.w.h.).
330. Id. at 794-95.
331, Id. at 795.
332. 824 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, n.w.h.).
333. Id. at 677.
334. Id. The court awarded five times the total taxable costs of the appeal, or $5,355.00.
Id.
335. Id. (citing Naydan v. Naydan, 800 S.W.2d 637, 643 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no
writ)).
336, Id. As a further justification for imposing damages for delay, the court noted that the
husband's lawyer was a family law specialist. Id. Justice Ovard dissented, stating that coun-
sel's "reliance on the docket sheet entries, albeit in error, was some indication that he had a
basis for a successful appeal." Id. at 678 (Ovard, J., dissenting).
337. Merrill Lynch Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Hughes, 827 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. 1992).
338. Id.




The Texas Supreme Court vacated the court of appeals' judgment and opin-
ion because the appeal became moot once the parties settled and jointly
moved to dismiss the appeal. 34° The court held that "[i]f no controversy
continues to exist between [the parties], the appeal is moot and [the appellate
court] must dismiss the cause. '341
In Teague v. Espinosa342 the appellee's counsel filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal as well as an affidavit in support stating that he did not receive
notice that an appeal bond had been filed or notice that the appellant filed a
designation of documents to be included in the transcript. Rule 46(d) re-
quires that the appellant notify "all parties in the trial court" of the filing of
the appeal bond or cash deposit in lieu of bond.343 Rule 51(b) requires that
the other parties receive notice of the appellant's designation of documents
to be included in the transcript.344 Counsel for the appellees did not know
that the appeal was pending until two days after the appellant had filed its
brief.
The court of appeals denied the motion to dismiss because "[a]ctual harm,
rather than a bald allegation of prejudice," is necessary to support dismissal
of an appeal based on lack of notice that an appeal bond has been filed. 345
The court was "troubled," however, by the appellant's counsel's "flaunting
of the mandatory notice requirements of the appellate rules" and ordered
that the appellant pay ten times the total taxable costs of court as a sanction
under Rule 46(d). 346
B. RELIANCE ON DOCKET ENTRIES ON APPEAL MAY LEAD TO
DISMISSAL
First National Bank v. Birnbaum 347 illustrates the danger of relying on
trial court docket entries on appeal. Docket entries are not a substitute for
court orders or judgments. 348 In First National Bank, the court of appeals
dismissed for want of jurisdiction an appeal from an award of sanctions
under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 13.349 The sanctions were imposed in
connection with an application for turnover relief to enforce the trial court's
judgment, and the court of appeals concluded that the sanctions order was
not appealable because the record did not indicate that the trial court had
determined the merits of the application for turnover relief.350
The appellant filed a motion for rehearing and a motion to supplement the
record to include a copy of the trial court's docket sheet showing that the
340. 827 S.W.2d at 859.
341. Id. (quoting General Land Office v. OXY U.S.A., Inc. 789 S.W.2d 569, 570 (Tex.
1990) (second alteration in original)).
342. 824 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1992, no writ).
343. TEX. R. APp. P. 46(d).
344. Id. 5 1(b).
345. 824 S.W.2d at 341 (citations omitted).
346. Id. at 341-42.
347. 826 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. App.-Austin 1992, n.w.h.).





application for turnover relief had been denied before the appeal was taken
from the sanctions order. Although the court acknowledged that the
supreme court has "relaxed the absolute prohibition" against the use of
docket entries in some circumstances, courts of appeal have limited the use
of docket entries "to correct clerical errors in judgments or orders." 35'
Overruling the appellant's motion to supplement the record and motion for
rehearing, the court of appeals noted that docket entries are "inherently un-
reliable" because they lack the formality of orders and judgments. 352 The
court based its decision on a long line of Texas cases holding that judgments
and orders must be entered of record to be effective and that docket entries
may not take the place of a separate order or judgment.353
In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Reed,354 an appeal from a summary
judgment, the insurer urged the court of appeals to consider several notes in
the trial court's docket sheet. The court of appeals cited the general rule
that "[a]n appellate court may not consider docket entries since they are
only made for the clerk's convenience and are usually unreliable. ' 355 The
court determined that the facts presented did not fall within the limited situ-
ations in which docket entries may be considered and noted that it would be
"especially inappropriate" to consider the docket entries in that case because
the court would be reviewing the docket entries as if they were findings of
fact and conclusions of law, which the trial court does not file in summary
judgment proceedings. 356
XII. MANDATE
A mandate is defined as "the official notice of the action of the appellate
court, directed to the court below, advising it of the action of the appellate
court and directing it to have its judgment duly recognized, obeyed, and
executed. '357 In Lewelling v. Bosworth, the Dallas court of appeals con-
cluded that although a trial court's refusal to act in compliance with the
351. Id. at 190-91. In N-S-W Corp. v. Snell, 561 S.W.2d 798, 799 (Tex. 1977) (orig. pro-
ceeding), the Texas Supreme Court stated that "[a] docket entry may supply facts in certain
situations, but it cannot be used to contradict or prevail over a final judicial order." Id. (cita-
tion omitted). At least two courts of appeal have held that the "certain situations" in which a
docket entry may supply facts are limited to correction of clerical errors in judgments or or-
ders. See Energo Int'l Corp. v. Modern Indus. Heating, Inc., 722 S.W.2d 149, 151 n.2 (Tex.
App.-Dallas 1986, no writ); Intercity Management Corp. v. Chambers, 820 S.W.2d 811, 812-
13 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991) (orig. proceeding) (limiting holding in Charles L.
Hardtke, Inc. v. Katz, 813 S.W.2d 548, 550 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ),
that a signed docket entry can qualify as an order setting aside a written dismissal order)).
352. First National Bank, 826 S.W.2d at 191 (citing Energo, 722 S.W.2d at 151 n.2).
353. Id. at 190 (citing Emerald Oaks Hotel/Conference Ctr, Inc. v. Zardenetta, 776
S.W.2d 577, 578 (Tex. 1989) (orig. proceeding); Clark & Co. v. Giles, 639 S.W.2d 449, 450
(Tex. 1982) (orig. proceeding); McCormack v. Guillot, 597 S.W.2d 345, 346 (Tex. 1980) (orig.
proceeding); Hamilton v. Empire Gas & Fuel Co., 110 S.W.2d 561, 566 (Tex. 1937)).
354. 826 SW.2d 659 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1992, writ granted).
355. Id. at 661 (citing Miller v. Kendall, 804 S.W.2d 933, 944 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1990, no writ)).
356. Id. (citing TEX. R. Civ. P. 296).




mandate may be a proper basis for a mandamus action, the mandate does
not necessarily give the prevailing party a right of action against another
party unless the appellate court has actually rendered jtidgment rather than
remanding with instructions to the lower court.35a In Lewelling, the Texas
Supreme Court's judgment reversing and remanding the case to the trial
court with instructions for rendition of a judgment did not constitute a
"court order" under Section 14.10 of the Texas Family Code upon which the
mother could rely to proceed against the father. 359
The trial court cannot grant relief in addition to that contained in a man-
date from an appellate court.36° The supreme court's mandate in Martin v.
Credit Protection Association, Inc.36 1 declared void a restrictive covenant,
dissolved a temporary injunction, and provided that the plaintiff pay all
court costs and that the defendant recover his costs from the plaintiff.36 2
The defendant also sought to recover attorneys' fees in the district court. 36 3
He argued that his recovery of attorneys' fees on his counterclaim would not
interfere with or contradict the supreme court's mandate. The trial court
denied his request, and the court of appeals affirmed.364 The court noted
that in cases involving remand with specific instructions, the district court's
discretion is limited by the instructions in the mandate.365 The court em-
phasized that if the supreme court had intended that the trial court address
the defendant's additional claims, it would have included such a direction in
its mandate.366
XIII. MOTIONS FOR REHEARING
Rule 100(d) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure governs further
motions for rehearing in the courts of appeal. 367 During the Survey period,
the Texas Supreme Court eliminated a source of confusion among practi-
tioners and clarified circumstances in which a party may file a further mo-
358. Id. at 642-43.
359. Id. at 643. The court of appeals noted that if the supreme court had rendered judg-
ment naming the mother as the managing conservator, the mother could have relied upon the
mandate as a "court order." Id.




363. The plaintiff also sought to recover unreimbursed business expenses that were the
subject of his counterclaim in the district court.
364. Id. at 256-57.
365. Id. at 256. The defendant in Martin relied upon Texacally Joint Venture v. King, 719
S.W.2d 652, 653 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, writ refd. n.r.e.), for the proposition that "the trial
judge must be allowed some reasonable exercise of discretion in fulfilling the terms of the
mandate." Martin, 824 S.W.2d at 256 (quoting Texacally Joint Venture, 719 S.W.2d at 653).
In Texacally, however, it was necessary for the trial court to exercise its discretion to set a
deadline -to comply with the mandate's instructions regarding specific performance. Id. at 256.
The defendant in Martin, however, sought affirmative relief beyond that provided in the
supreme court's mandate. Id.
366. Martin, 824 S.W.2d at 257 (citing TEX. R. App. P. 184).
367. TEX. R. App. P. 100(d).
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tion for rehearing as a matter of right.368 In Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores,
Inc.,369 the respondent challenged the supreme court's jurisdiction over the
petitioner's application for writ of error on the basis that the application was
not timely filed. The supreme court had granted the petitioner's motion for
extension of time for filing an application for writ of error and ordered that
the application be filed within forty days of the date the last timely filed
motion for rehearing was overruled. 370 The court of appeals overruled the
first motion for rehearing but changed its opinion on rehearing. 371 The peti-
tioner filed a second motion for rehearing and filed its application for writ of
error within forty days after the second motion for rehearing was overruled.
The respondent argued that the petitioner's second motion for rehearing
was invalid because the opinion on rehearing contained only "minor nonsub-
stantive changes" and the petitioners had no need to complain of the modifi-
cation. 372 The Texas Supreme Court overruled the respondent's motion to
dismiss and held that a party may file a further motion for rehearing as a
matter of right if, in conjunction with the overruling of a prior motion for
rehearing, the court of appeals alters in any way its opinion or judgment.373
The Court reasoned that the uncertainty injected into the appellate process
by a case by case basis determination of further filings outweighed any risk
of delay from parties filing further motions for rehearing. 374
XIV. CONCLUSION
The Texas Supreme Court's opinions during the Survey period demon-
strate, among other things, that procedural technicalities should not inhibit
unnecessarily the right to appeal. The amendments to the Texas Rules of
Appellate Procedure proposed by the Committee on State Rules of the Ap-
pellate Practice and Advocacy Section support that policy as well. 375 The
proposed amendments include a number of methods to make appeal less
expensive and less complicated. 376 For example, the Committee proposes
adopting the federal practice of allowing the original trial court transcript to
be sent to the appellate court. 377 The proposed amendment to Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 51 would thus allow that practice for "good cause, in-
cluding the time or expense of preparing copies .. .,"378 In addition, the
368. Havner v. E-Z Mart Stores, Inc., 825 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1992).
369. Id.
370. Id. at 457 n.l (citing TEX. R. APP. P. 130(d)).




375. See STATE BAR OF TEXAS, REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON STATE APPELLATE
RULES: RECOMMENDED AMENDMENTS TO THE TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE
AND TEXAS RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1992) (objective of proposed amendments is to
make appellate procedure "easier and less expensive for both the appellate practitioner and the
appellate courts").
376. Id.
377. Id. at 8 (proposed amendment to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 51(e)).




proposed amendments to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 81 and 131
assist absent parties in protecting their rights.379 In essence, both the Court
and the Committee are working to eliminate procedural traps and to make
the process of appeal easier for both the bench and the bar.
379. Id. at 17-18, 20-22 (proposed amendments to Rules 81 and 131).
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